論共同但有區別的責任原則在海洋塑料污染國際立法中的適用性

周晟全 施余兵

一、問題的提出

聯合國環境大會（United Nations Environment Assembly）在2022 年3 月2日的第5/14 號決議“結束塑料污染：制定具有法律約束力的國際文書”中要求聯合國環境規劃署（United Nations Environment Programme，以下簡稱“UNEP”）召集政府間談判委員會，并于2022 年下半年開始工作，爭取在2024 年底完成相關工作。1參見United Nations Environment Programme, Scenario note for the first session of the intergovernmental negotiating committee to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, UNEP website (27 Nov 2022), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/4131 3/Scenario_note_E.pdf.UNEP 旨在制定一項具有法律約束力的塑料污染（包括海洋環境中的塑料污染）國際文書的政府間談判委員會（Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, 以下簡稱“INC”）第一屆、第二屆會議（以下簡稱“INC-1”“INC-2”）已分別于2022 年11 月28 日至12 月2 日、2023 年5 月29 日至6 月2 日在烏拉圭埃斯特角城會議展覽中心、法國巴黎聯合國教科文組織總部舉行。

在INC-1及INC-2的會議進程中，包括中國、阿根廷、拉丁美洲和加勒比地區、2參見International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 28 November 2022, ISSD website (10 Dec 2022), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marineenvironment-negotiating-committee-inc1-daily-report-28nov2022.南非、塞內加爾、3參見International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 30 November 2022, ISSD website (10 Dec 2022), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marineenvironment-negotiating-committee-inc1-daily-report-30nov2022.印度、菲律賓4參見International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 31 May 2023,ISSD website (7 Jun 2023), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marine-environmentnegotiating-committee-inc2-daily-report-31may2023;及第二聯絡小組5參見International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 1 June 2023,ISSD website (7 Jun 2023), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marine-environmentnegotiating-committee-inc2-daily-report-1jun2023;在內的多個國家、地區代表團及聯絡小組在一般性發言和文書結構的范圍、目標以及備選方案環節中提出，應考慮共同但有區別的責任原則（以下簡稱“CBDR 原則”），這些提案體現了部分參加政府間談判國家的政治意愿，應引起國際社會的重視。然而，一個無法回避的事實是，CBDR 原則迄今僅明確適用于氣候變化領域，在塑料污染領域，特別是海洋塑料污染領域是否適用該原則仍然存在爭議，需要進行更深層次的探討。為了解決這一問題，本文將首先討論CBDR 原則的源起與意涵，并總結CBDR 原則在氣候變化領域外的反映與體現，隨后將就CBDR 原則在海洋塑料污染領域的適用性進行分析，并就未來塑料污染國際文書納入CBDR 原則時的具體方式進行展望。

二、CBDR 原則的源起與意涵

CBDR 原則經歷了長期的發展與內涵演變，最終成為氣候變化領域的基本原則。本部分所涉及的源起，即指在氣候變化領域中CBDR 原則的演進；而意涵，則指CBDR 原則所映射的本質內容，即“共同利益”與“實質公平”。6參見季華：《“共同但有區別責任”與氣候變化國際法律機制》，中國政法大學出版社2022 年版，第64-72 頁。

（一）CBDR 原則的源起

CBDR 原則的演進，可分為初步形成、具體確立和進一步發展三個階段。

1.CBDR 原則的初步形成

學界一般認為，CBDR 原則在國際環境法誕生之后才初步形成。1972 年斯德哥爾摩人類環境會議以及《聯合國人類環境會議宣言》（以下簡稱“《人類環境宣言》”）的通過標志著國際環境法的誕生。7參見林燦鈴等著：《國際環境法的產生與發展》，人民法院出版社2006 年版，第50 頁。該宣言首次含蓄地提出了環境領域的共同責任和區別責任的內容。例如，《人類環境宣言》提出，“保護和改善人類環境是關系到全世界各國人民的幸福和經濟發展的重要問題，也是全世界各國人民的迫切希望和各國政府的責任?！?《聯合國人類環境會議宣言》第一部分第2 條?！八袊业沫h境政策應該提高，而不應該損及發展中國家現有或將來的發展潛力?！?《聯合國人類環境會議宣言》第二部分第11 條。盡管這種表述相當審慎，仍然說明“共同責任”與“區別責任”的概念在當時已經出現。但CBDR 原則并沒有在當時確立，而僅處在“初步形成”的階段，主要原因在于，在人類環境會議舉行時，作為后續CBDR 原則主要支持者的發展中國家，其關注重心并不在全球環境合作，而更注重于國際經濟新秩序的形成，因此，CBDR 原則的形成條件在當時并不成熟。10參見寇麗：《共同但有區別責任原則：演進、屬性與功能》，載《法律科學（西北政法大學學報）》2013 年第4 期，第95-103 頁。

2.CBDR 原則的確立

1992 年5 月9 日通過并于同年6 月在聯合國環境與發展會議上開放簽署的《聯合國氣候變化框架公約》（以下簡稱“UNFCCC”），以及前述會議通過的《關于環境與發展的里約宣言》（以下簡稱“《里約宣言》”），均對CBDR 原則進行明確規定。UNFCCC 在序言中提到，“……承認氣候變化的全球性，要求所有國家根據其共同但有區別的責任和各自的能力及其社會和經濟條件，盡可能開展最廣泛的合作，并參與有效和適當的國際應對行動……”11《聯合國氣候變化框架公約》序言。；《里約宣言》則指出，“……鑒于導致全球環境退化的各種不同因素，各國負有共同的但是又有差別的責任……”。12《關于環境與發展的里約宣言》原則7。

同時，《里約宣言》中提到，“……發達國家承認，鑒于他們的社會給全球環境帶來的壓力，以及他們所掌握的技術和財力資源，他們在追求可持續發展的國際努力中負有責任?！?3同上注。這一規定明確指出，發達國家在氣候變化領域中負有歷史責任，也認可發達國家和發展中國家當下的國情區別，其所體現的“歷史責任”“國家能力”兩大要素，被視為CBDR 原則適用的前提條件。

簡而言之，UNFCCC 和《里約宣言》的規定均體現了二十世紀九十年代的國際社會對氣候變化問題的理解和態度，各國對CBDR 原則的認識也得到了進一步深化，試圖尋求氣候變化領域的“實質公平”。但遺憾的是，二者的規定均未在明確CBDR 原則的基礎上作出更為細致且具體的規定，CBDR 原則的具體應用仍然存在發展的空間。

3.CBDR 原則的進一步發展

1997 年UNFCCC 第三次締約國會議通過的《京都議定書》對CBDR 原則作出了具體化的規定。概而言之，《京都議定書》明確了發達國家的溫室氣體減排任務，卻并未對發展中國家規定強制減排義務?！毒┒甲h定書》所采取的“二分法”是嚴格適用CBDR 原則的體現，正因如此，發達國家與發展中國家之間就CBDR原則的適用與否產生了極大的分歧，爭論相較此前更加激烈。

2015 年通過的《巴黎協定》為 2020 年后全球合作應對氣候變化指明了方向和目標，是公認的全面平衡、持久有效、具有法律約束力的氣候變化國際協議。14參見朱松麗，高翔：《從哥本哈根到巴黎——國際氣候制度的變遷和發展》，清華大學出版社2017 年版，第247 頁。CBDR 原則在《巴黎協定》中多次被明確提及，但其內涵卻發生了一定的改變，形成了“共區責任+各自能力+不同國情”的要件形態：15參見周?。骸墩撎贾泻驮妇跋碌墓餐袇^別責任原則》，載《武漢大學學報（哲學社會科學版）》2023 年第2 期，第152-163 頁。由《京都議定書》通過“二分法”規定的發達國家強制減排、發展中國家自愿參與減排的溫室氣體減排模式，改為通過“國家自主貢獻”進行減排的新模式，將所有締約方都納入溫室氣體減排所涵蓋的范圍內。16《巴黎協定》第4 條?！栋屠鑵f定》之后，UNFCCC 第二十六次締約國會議通過的《格拉斯哥氣候公約》中仍然對CBDR 原則采堅持的態度，并對《巴黎協定》中涉及CBDR 原則的規定進行了回顧與重申。17參見United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Glasgow Climate Pact,UNFCCC website (15 Dec 2022), https://unfccc.int/documents/310475.

（二）CBDR 原則的意涵

從前文所述不難看出，CBDR 原則本身是在不斷發展、變化的。有學者認為，經歷了多年的發展，CBDR 原則的內涵已經發生了重大變化，在其“共同責任”和“有區別的責任”兩個要素中，后者的內涵發生了較大的變化。18參見SHI Yubing, Climate Change and International Shipping: The Regulatory Framework for the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Brill Nijhoff, 2017, p. 86-89.然而，筆者認為，CBDR 原則的意涵并未發生太大的變化。從CBDR 原則的名稱可以看出，該原則包含兩方面內容——共同責任與區別責任，這兩方面內容直接體現了CBDR 原則的意涵，即“共同利益”與“實質公平”。19同前注6，季華。

1.共同責任所體現的共同利益

如前文所述，“共同責任”這一概念最早體現于《人類環境宣言》中，并在UNFCCC、《京都議定書》等后續文書中得到進一步的確認。各國應當在環境領域與氣候變化領域承擔共同責任的主要原因在于，地球生態系統是一個整體，整體中的任一要素遭受破壞，都必將對整體產生影響，而人類的共同利益又與作為整體的地球生態系統之間存在直接聯系。因此，環境領域與氣候變化領域的議題，對人類的影響是在人類的共同利益層面出現的，也正因如此，針對這些議題，需要所有國家承擔共同責任。

2.區別責任所體現的實質公平

為了探求實質上的公平，CBDR 原則引入了“區別責任”。正如《里約宣言》原則7 所述，這種區別責任的來源有兩方面，既基于國家的歷史責任，也基于當下的國家能力，前文提到，這兩大要素，也被視作適用CBDR 的前提條件。20同前注12，《關于環境與發展的里約宣言》。自工業革命以來，老牌的工業化發達國家的發展對地球生態環境產生了前所未有的破壞，這些破壞也是導致當下環境現狀的主要原因。發達國家認識到其國內環境受到破壞后，開始嘗試將高污染、高排放的工業建立在其國家范圍之外，從而將污染與排放轉移至發展中國家；同時，發達國家的人口相比于全球人口，雖然所占基數較小，卻是造成目前的全球環境污染的“主要推手”?；谖廴菊吒顿M原則（Polluter-pays Principle），發達國家應當承擔歷史上的環境破壞責任。而發展中國家受限于目前的國家能力，承擔發達國家轉移的污染與排放后，在環境治理上能夠發揮的能力十分有限，難以通過自身的能力充分表達國家自身的意愿；且發展中國家中不乏人口大國，為保障其人民生活，需要進一步發展工業以促進經濟發展。因此，為了在發展中國家和發達國家之間達成實質上的公平，需要發展中國家和發達國家承擔區別責任。

考慮到發展中國家的能力和國情問題，《巴黎協定》認可發展中國家在落實溫室氣體減排時所面臨的困境，對發展中國家作出相對較為“寬松”的規定，換言之，《巴黎協定》為“有區別的責任”提供了落實可能。除引入前文所述的國家自主貢獻外，《巴黎協定》還對包括資金援助、技術轉讓和能力建設等內容進行了相對細致的規定，其中著重為加強能力建設規定了具體落實措施。21《巴黎協定》第11 條。

三、CBDR 原則在氣候變化領域外的反映與體現

盡管CBDR 原則起源并發展于氣候變化領域，但在氣候變化領域外的其他領域，也存在一些條約和判例實踐能夠反映、體現CBDR 原則。

（一）《生物多樣性公約》

自1988 年英國生態學家諾曼·邁爾斯確定了植物特有程度高、棲息地喪失嚴重的熱帶雨林“熱點”（Hotspots）后，22參見Norman Myers, Threatened biotas: “Hot spots” in tropical forests, Environmentalist,Vol. 8:3, p. 187-208 (1988).多個政府間組織經過多年工作，至2016 年，共認定了36 個“生物多樣性熱點”，這些地區被視作地球上生物最豐富但仍受到威脅的地區。23參見Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund, Biodiversity Hotspots Defined, CEPF website (15 Dec 2022), https://www. cepf.net/our-work/biodiversity-hotspots/hotspots-defined.

圖1 生物多樣性熱點全球分布圖24圖1 系Kellee Koenig 制作的生物多樣性熱點全球分布圖，下載自https://zenodo.org/record/4311850#.Y66f FfVBze9。

從生物多樣性熱點的全球分布可以看出，目前絕大多數的生物多樣性存在于東南亞、非洲以及南美洲的發展中國家。但考慮到國家能力問題，發展中國家并不能較好地對生物多樣性進行保護；同時，在對生物多樣性加以利用的領域，例如生物技術等，發展中國家直至進入21 世紀后才在相關領域具有顯著發展。25參見The World Academy of Science, Biotechnology: A growing field in the developing world, TWAS website (15 Dec 2022), https://twas.org/article/biotechnology-growing-fielddeveloping-world.此前，對生物多樣性的利用多數是在發達國家進行，而發達國家的生物多樣性從目前來看已經損失極大。因此，發達國家由于其歷史責任，對資助發展中國家保護生物多樣性負有責任，同樣負有與發展中國家共享其利用生物多樣性所獲利益的責任。

盡管CBDR 原則并沒有在《生物多樣性公約》（以下簡稱“CBD”）中明確被提及，但CBD 的文本中仍含蓄地反映和體現了CBDR 原則。例如，CBD 序言中提到，“確認生物多樣性的保護是全人類的共同關切事項”、第20 條第2款提到，“發達國家締約國應提供新的額外的資金，以使發展中國家締約國能支付它們因執行那些履行本公約義務的措施而承負的一定的全部增加費用，并使它們能享受到本公約條款產生的惠益?！?6《生物多樣性公約》序言、第20 條第2 款。同時，CBD 第15、16、19 條關于遺傳資源取得、技術的取得與轉讓、生物技術的處理與分配等規定，實際上都體現了發達國家與發展中國家在責任承擔上的“區別化”。有學者提出，包括CBDR 原則在內的“里約原則”必須成為CBD 框架的支柱，并指出發達國家在生物多樣性喪失問題上應承擔歷史責任。27參見Viviana Mu?oz Tellez, Proposals to Advance the Negotiations of the Post 2020 Biodiversity Framework, the South Centre website, (15 Dec 2022), https://www.southcentre.int/policybrief-90-march-2021/.

（二）《關稅與貿易總協定》

世界貿易組織的許多協定中都對發展中國家提供了諸如特殊優惠、技術援助、分階段實施等更加寬松的義務。28參見Joost Pauwelyn, The End of Differential Treatment for Developing Countries? Lessons from the Trade and Climate Change Regimes, Review of European Community &International Environmental Law, Vol. 22:1, p. 29-41 (2013).可以說，在貿易機制領域，世界貿易組織承認發展中國家與發達國家的國家能力差異和發展需要的差異，并相應地賦予雙方“區別化”的義務。有學者提出，發達國家應承擔“相當大部分成本的道德責任”。29參見Robyn Eckersley, Understanding the interplay between the climate and trade regimes,Climate and Trade Polici es in a Post-2012 World, United Nations Environment Programme,2009, p. 11-18.原因在于，在貿易領域，發達國家曾經或已經獲得了相當大的收益，而發展中國家則面臨更加高昂的貿易活動實施成本，這種成本的出現，部分原因在于發達國家曾經對發展中國家的殖民化等行為，換言之，發達國家對發展中國家高昂的貿易活動實施成本在一定程度上負有“歷史責任”。

《關稅與貿易總協定》（以下簡稱“GATT”）中也存在對CBDR 原則的反映和體現。例如，GATT 第三十六條提到，“……（丙）注意到發展中國家和其它國家之間的生活水平有一個很大的差距；（?。┱J為單獨和聯合行動對促進發展中的各締約國的經濟發展，并使這些國家的生活水平得到迅速提高是必要的；……”“……（丙）在考慮采取本協定所許可的其它措施以解決某項特殊問題時，應特別注意發展中的締約國的貿易利益；……”；30《關稅與貿易總協定》第36、37 條。1979 年“東京回合”所通過的《對發展中國家的差別、更優惠待遇及對等和更充分參與問題的決定》中的規定也對CBDR 原則存在一定的反映和體現。

（三）國際海洋法法庭關于“擔保個人和實體從事‘區域’內活動的國家的責任和義務”的第17 號咨詢意見案

國際海洋法法庭（The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea，以下簡稱“ITLOS”）關于“擔保個人和實體從事‘區域’內活動的國家的責任和義務”的第17 號咨詢意見案（以下簡稱“第17 號咨詢意見案”）由國際海底管理局理事會于2010 年5 月6 日向ITLOS 提出請求。在對“締約國在擔?！畢^域’內活動方面負有哪些法律責任和義務？”這一問題進行解答時，ITLOS 在咨詢意見第七部分“發展中國家的利益和需要”中進行了說明。

ITLOS 在咨詢意見中首先對發展中國家和發達國家在關于擔保國責任和賠償責任的一般規定中的平等地位進行說明，指出這是為了防止方便擔保國的擴散，并提出這些意見“并不排除規定擔保國直接責任的規則可以為發達擔保國和發展中擔保國提供不同的待遇”。31參見International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), ITLOS website (15 Dec 2022), https://itlos.org/main/cases/list-ofcases/case-no-17/.但ITLOS 在咨詢意見中僅提及規定這種“區別”的待遇的理論來源——《聯合國海洋法公約》中涉及確保發展中國家開展“區域”內的活動并特別考慮它們的利益和需要的條款，包括序言、第140 條第1 款、第148條等。換言之，在國家對個人或實體在“區域”內的活動承擔擔保責任這一問題上，ITLOS 作出對發展中國家的優惠待遇，更多考慮的是發展中國家在能力上的不足，而未考慮類似氣候變化領域內或前文提到的CBD、GATT 中的發達國家在歷史上的責任。需要注意的是，ITLOS 考慮的能力也“只是對發達國家和發展中國家的差異的一種寬泛和不精確的稱謂，重要的是一個國家在相關科學和技術領域的科學知識和技術能力水平?！?2同上注。

四、CBDR 原則在海洋塑料污染國際立法中的適用性

（一）海洋塑料污染領域符合CBDR 原則適用的要件

如前所述，CBDR 原則適用的要件包括“發達國家應對環境問題承擔歷史責任”及“發達國家和發展中國家具備不同的能力”兩方面要求，海洋塑料污染領域的發展情況與這兩方面要求高度契合。

1.海洋塑料污染問題的產生主要歸咎于發達國家的歷史責任

UNEP 在其報告中曾提到，“全球產生的70 億噸塑料垃圾中，只有不到10%被回收。數以百萬噸計的塑料垃圾流失到環境中”“全球每年有近80%的河流塑料排放到海洋中，每年的排放量在80 萬噸至270 萬噸之間，其中小型城市河流污染最嚴重”。33United Nations Environment Programme, Our planet is choking on plastic, UNEP website(15 Dec 2022), https://www.unep.org/interactives/beat-plastic-pollution/?gclid=EAIaIQobC hMIrur3y62m_AIVDJ1LBR24GQ5dEAAYASAAEgJBTfD_BwE.海洋塑料污染情況日益嚴重，而陸源塑料垃圾是海洋塑料污染，特別是海洋微塑料污染的主要來源之一，超過80%的海洋微塑料來源于陸源塑料廢物。34參見[希]赫里西·K. 卡拉芭娜吉奧提、揚尼斯·K. 卡拉魯吉奧提斯編著：《水和廢水中的微塑料》，安立會等譯，中國環境出版集團2022 年版，第1 頁。

相較于發展中國家，發達國家的人均塑料垃圾年產量極高。根據Kara Lavender Law 等人2020 年的數據統計，2016 年，美國人口產生的塑料垃圾量居世界首位，人均塑料垃圾年產量也以超過130 千克/年居于世界首位，而歐盟盡管人口總量僅有中國的40%左右，但其產生的塑料垃圾總量仍超過中國；同時，人均塑料垃圾年產量處于高位的還有英國、德國、韓國等。35參見Kara Lavender Law et al., The United States’ contribution of plastic waste to land and ocean, Science Advances, Vol. 6:44, eabd0288 (2020).

德國 82.3 81.16歐盟 511.2 54.56中國 1378.7 15.67

上世紀七、八十年代，為了應對逐步惡化的環境問題，發達國家的環境政策日益嚴格。面對高昂的垃圾處理費用，發達國家選擇將廢棄物出口到發展中國家，以回避垃圾處理問題。正如美國國家科學院（National Academy of Sciences）在其2022 年的報告Reckoning with the U.S. Role in Global Ocean Plastic Waste 中所提到的，“在國際上，發達經濟體通過向欠發達經濟體出口塑料廢物來外部化廢物管理成本，這些經濟體最終首當其沖地承受塑料廢物的經濟、社會和環境成本。2018 年之前，美國將大部分塑料垃圾出口到中國。在中國禁止大部分塑料垃圾進口后，美國將其出口的垃圾轉移到其他東南亞國家?！?7National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Reckoning with the U.S. Role in Global Ocean Plastic Waste, The National Academies Press, 2022, p. 30.

2017 年7 月18 日，國務院辦公廳印發《關于禁止洋垃圾入境推進固體廢物進口管理制度改革實施方案》（以下簡稱“禁廢令”），我國正式全面禁止“洋垃圾”入境。在此之前，我國便是全球“洋垃圾”的最大目的地，而廢塑料便是“洋垃圾”的“重要組成部分”。根據聯合國商品貿易統計數據庫（UN Comtrade）中2000-2004 年、2013-2017 年的進出口數據，中國香港、美國、日本、德國長期居于向我國出口廢塑料的排名高位，換言之，中國曾經長期扮演發達國家“廢塑料收集池”的角色。

需要說明的是，雖然根據表2、表3 的數據，我國香港地區長期居于向我國出口廢塑料國家（地區）的排名高位，但其所出口的多是在當地進行轉港的廢塑料。從2013 至2017 年香港地區進、出口廢塑料的數據的對比可以看出，香港實際上也承擔了一部分進口廢塑料的“消化”工作，這些廢塑料的最初主要來源國仍是包括美國、日本、德國、英國在內的發達國家。

表2 2000 至2004年我國廢塑料進口數據（單位：萬噸）38表2 至表6 系作者根據聯合國商品貿易統計數據庫（UN Comtrade）中的數據制作的，數據保留小數點后兩位。

表3 2013 至2017年我國廢塑料進口數據（單位：萬噸）

德國 64.09 64.43 45.09 44.49 25.73 243.83英國 21.91 27.58 19.88 25.2 14.39 108.96

表4 2013 至2017年香港廢塑料進口與出口至中國大陸數據（單位：萬噸）

在我國“禁廢令”出臺后，發達國家將尋找轉嫁廢塑料處理成本的出口目的地的目光轉向了東南亞國家，東南亞國家成為了發達國家出口廢塑料的新傾銷地。根據綠色和平組織（Greenpeace）發布的報告，東盟國家的廢塑料進口全球占比從2016 年的5.38%直升至2018 年的27%。39Greenpeace, Southeast Asia’s Struggles against the Plastic Waste Trade, Greenpeace website, (15 Dec 2022), https://www.greenpeace.org/malaysia/publication/1905/southeastasias-struggle-against-the-plastic-waste-trade/.以越南和馬來西亞為例，2015 年至2018 年，其廢塑料的進口量大幅上升，近乎成倍增長，而這些廢塑料的來源國仍然是發達國家。需要指出的是，馬來西亞2018 年同樣針對廢塑料進口出臺了多項限制政策，這也是馬來西亞2018 年進口的廢塑料總量相較2017 年減少的原因之一。

表5 我國“禁廢令”出臺前后越南廢塑料進口數據（單位：萬噸）

表6 我國“禁廢令”出臺前后馬來西亞廢塑料進口數據（單位：萬噸）

不可否認，廢塑料的進出口活動本身是一種商業行為，但發達國家采取將處理廢塑料的責任轉嫁至發展中國家的做法，本質上是在逃避其應承擔的環境責任。僅以美國為例，美國人口僅占世界人口總量的4%，2016 年卻制造了世界上17%的塑料垃圾，而其中大部分被出口到發展中國家。40同前注37, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, p. 50.廢塑料向發展中國家的涌入，對發展中國家的生態平衡造成了嚴重破壞，加劇了當地的塑料污染，導致全球生態系統的健康狀況進一步惡化，可以說，塑料污染現狀的根源正是發達國家的責任規避與轉移行為。

通過此前論述可以看出，部分發達國家在人均塑料垃圾年產量上遠超發展中國家，且為了規避處理塑料垃圾的費用與責任，通過廢塑料進出口活動將費用與責任轉嫁至發展中國家。這種行為對塑料污染的現狀是具有一定的促進作用，因此，部分發達國家對塑料污染的現狀是負有類似氣候變化領域中的“歷史責任”的，符合CBDR 原則適用的第一項要件。

2.發達國家和發展中國家在治理海洋塑料污染方面存在較大的能力差異

從來源角度出發，廢物管理不善是造成塑料污染的最大原因。41參見United Nations Environment Programme, Plastic Science, UNEP website, (27 Nov 2022), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/41263/Plastic_Science_E.pdf.而廢物管理與國家的經濟能力水平、綜合治理能力呈正相關。同時，海洋塑料污染治理是一項主要依靠國家能力完成的工作，涉及陸源廢塑料回收與處理以及海洋微塑料的監測、采集與分析等內容。但由于發達國家和發展中國家之間的發展水平不同，人民的環保意識也存在較大的差異，執行國際環境條約的能力自然有所不同。42參見孫凱：《全球海洋塑料污染問題及治理對策》，載《國際治理》2021 年第15 期，第44-48 頁。僅以海洋微塑料污染問題為例，目前對微塑料的來源與真實入海量尚存在認知上的不明確，也仍尚未形成較為穩定的處理方法。43參見尚勝美：《海洋微塑料污染狀況及其應對措施建議》，載《資源節約與環?！?022年第2 期，第83-86 頁。

UNEP 在第5/14 號決議“結束塑料污染：制定具有法律約束力的國際文書”以及INC-1 的設想說明中，也多次指出“同時考慮到各國的國情和能力”“同時考慮到《關于環境與發展的里約宣言》的原則以及各國的國情和能力等”，并要求政府間談判委員會對能力建設、技術援助和資金進行討論。44同前注1, United Nations Environment Programme; United Nations Environment Programme,End plastic pollution: Towards an international legally binding instrument, UNEP website(27 Nov 2022), https://documents-d ds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/K22/007/33/pdf/K2200733.pdf?OpenElement.

因此，在海洋塑料污染領域，需要特別注重發展中國家的需求。發達國家在解決本國塑料污染問題的同時，應加強對發展中國家在技術、資金、能力建設等方面的支持。45參見聯合國環境規劃署：《中國代表團在塑料污染國際文書政府間談判委員會第一次會議的一般性發言》，載聯合國環境規劃署網站，https://apps1.unep.org/resolutions/uploads/china_inc-1_statements_0_0.pdf?？梢哉f，在海洋塑料污染的治理方面，存在發展中國家與發達國家之間的較大的能力差別，符合CBDR 原則適用的第二項要件。

（二）海洋塑料污染國際立法的目的契合CBDR 原則的意涵

如前文所述，CBDR 原則的意涵包括“共同利益”與“實質公平”兩方面內容，海洋塑料污染國際立法的主要目的在于解決這一全球性難題，在保護全球環境的同時，兼顧發展中國家的不同發展需求和能力差異。這意味著，海洋梳理污染的國際立法在目的上與CBDR 原則高度契合。

1.海洋塑料污染國際立法的“共同利益”

人類與環境是不可分割的，對環境進行保護也是對人類的生存進行保護。因此，人類需要共同努力，逐步改善、修復生存環境，共同面對挑戰。

塑料作為上世紀新出現的高分子材料，以穩定的性質得到青睞，但也正因其特性，塑料在環境中并不易降解，而是在環境中不斷累積。即使是所謂的“可降解塑料”的降解在符合嚴苛的降解條件下，也需要較長的時間，且其最終所能達到的真正降解水平也與塑料本身的種類與質量相關。46參見金琰等：《生物可降解塑料在不同環境條件下的降解研究進展》，載《生物科學學報》2022 年第5 期，第1784-1808 頁。在海洋塑料污染領域，目前存在的主要問題是微塑料污染，基于目前的研究可以發現，微塑料在海洋各處的表層水體、海底沉積物都被監測到存在。47參見Ian Kane et al., Seafloor microplastic hotspots controlled by deep-sea circulation,Science, Vol. 368:6495, p. 1140-1145 (2020).

塑料導致的對海洋環境的危害是多角度、深層次的。具體而言，首先，微生物和藻類可在塑料表面附著、生長，受到洋流的影響，易跨界導致外來生物入侵，進而破壞被入侵區域內的原生生物棲息地；其次，由于微塑料的體積小，被海洋生物誤食并進行消化后，在海洋生物鏈內形成富集，并最終隨著人類對海洋生物的捕撈、食用而進入人體內部。48參見夏斌等：《微塑料在海洋漁業水域中的污染現狀及其生物效應研究進展》，載《漁業科學進展》2019 年第3 期，第178-180 頁。研究表明，在人類的血液內已發現微塑料的存在，49參見Chukwuma Muanya, Okra, Aloe employed to filter microplastics out of wastewater,the Guardian (31 Mar 2022), https://guardian.ng/features/health/okra-aloe-employed-tofilter-microplastics-out-of-wastewater/.盡管學者認為微塑料的人體的影響尚待證明，但世界衛生組織認為，人體對極小的微塑料吸收的可能性較高。50參見世界衛生組織：《世衛組織呼吁進一步研究微塑料并大力處理塑料污染問題》，載世界衛生組織網站，https://www.who.int/zh/news-room/detail/22-08-2019-who-callsfor-more-research-into-microplastics-and-a-crackdown-on-plastic-pollution。此外，未降解的塑料也容易被海洋生物誤食并無法消化，導致海洋生物最終死亡。

圖2 海洋微塑料的全球分布51圖2 系美國國家海洋和大氣管理局制作的海洋微塑料濃度分布圖，下載自https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/b296879cc1984fda833a8acc93e31476/page/Page/?views=Map-Viewer%2CDisplay-Filters。

海洋是地球生態系統的重要組成部分，而對地球生態環境的保護責任，世界各國都應承擔，沒有國家可以逃避這一責任。正如習近平總書記所言，“人類是命運共同體，保護生態環境是全球面臨的共同挑戰和共同責任?！?2習近平：《推動我國生態文明建設邁上新臺階》，載《奮斗》2019 年第3 期，第1-16 頁。塑料對海洋環境造成的影響，正在逐漸破壞海洋生態系統的穩定性，且對人類的健康安全造成潛在威脅，國際社會因此應當對海洋環境中的塑料污染承擔共同責任。有學者認為，引入全生命周期方法（Full Life Cycle Approach, FLCA）將使CBDR 原則在未來的文書中被支持，但存在難以在情況和能力不同的國家間準確分配這種責任的問題。53參見WANG Sen, International law-making process of combating plastic pollution: Status Quo, debates and prospects, Marine Policy, Vol. 147, 105376 (2023).因此，在塑料污染國際文書的后續談判中，尚需進一步對國家能力等內容進行更深層次的討論。

2.海洋塑料污染國際立法的“實質公平”

發達國家將大量的廢塑料向發展中國家轉移，既極大減輕了處理廢塑料所需的成本，又避免了處理廢塑料過程中可能對其國內環境造成的潛在影響；發展中國家雖然從利用廢塑料的過程中獲得些許有限的利益，但受限于其能力，往往無法在處理廢塑料的過程中避免污染擴散，從而導致其國內環境受到直接破壞。前文已對海洋塑料污染領域的“歷史責任”與“國家能力”進行論述，而“歷史責任”與“國家能力”兩項要素也正是對實質公平的真正落實的兩項決定性因素。因此，在海洋塑料污染領域內也存在“實質公平”的落實可能。

但是，這種落實可能需要建立在科學的分析與評估基礎之上。筆者認為，結合目前的談判情況，UNEP 在未來規制塑料污染的國際文書中，可以參考《巴黎協定》現有的規制模式，在對歷史責任、國家能力和不同國情進行科學分析與評估的基礎上，將對塑料污染，特別是海洋塑料污染應負較高責任的國家與受污染影響較大的國家進行區分，通過對國家自主貢獻的通報與執行、技術轉讓、資金援助與能力建設等方式進行具體規定，賦予不同國家不同的責任，以期實質公平的最終落實，并將有利于塑料污染的實際治理。

五、結 語

盡管在現有的氣候變化領域外的實踐中并未明確將CBDR 原則列為一般原則，但其中的具體規定亦在一定程度上反映和體現了CBDR 原則，也有學者認為可以將CBDR 原則引入氣候變化領域外的其他領域。通過對CBDR 原則的內涵、條約實踐和判例的考察，并結合對該原則兩大要素的分析，不難看出，在發達國家負有歷史責任的塑料污染治理中，引入CBDR 原則具有一定的可行性。筆者認為，在INC-1 及INC-2 的會議進程中，部分國家代表團要求考慮在塑料污染的國際立法中納入CBDR 原則的提議具有充分的理論和現實基礎。

然而，從目前的談判進展看，CBDR 原則的適用需要考慮多方面因素，特別是發達國家與發展中國家之間的政治意愿不同，如何在兩大陣營中達成一致是一個巨大的挑戰。因此，CBDR 原則最終能否引入新國際文書，仍需要參考INC 主席古斯塔沃·梅薩-夸德拉未來準備的國際文書“零草案”以及定于2023 年11 月13 至19 日于肯尼亞內羅畢召開的政府間談判委員會第三屆會議（INC-3）以及未來的后續談判工作。

On the Applicability of the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Legislation on Marine Plastic Pollution

ZHOU Shengquan, SHI Yubing*

Abstract: The second session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, established by the United Nations Environment Programme to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, came to a close on 2 June 2023. Since the first session, delegations from several States, including China, have advocated for the incorporation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in the future international instrument. However, there is currently no treaty practice that directly applies this principle in areas beyond climate change. In this context,this paper delves into the origins and implications of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and takes an empirical approach to analyze its applicability in international legislation on plastic pollution, particularly in the marine environment. The aim is to enable future international instruments regulating marine plastic pollution to effectively strike a balance between the interests of developed and developing States.

Key Words: Principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; Plastic pollution; Marine plastic pollution; UNEP; INC-2

* ZHOU Shengquan, South China Sea Institute, Xiamen University, China, e-mail:zhoushengquan@stu.xmu.edu.cn; SHI Yubing, Professor, South China Sea Institute, Ph.D in Law, Xiamen University, China.

?THE AUTHORS AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

I. Introduction

In resolution 5/14 of 2 March 2022 entitledEndplasticpollution:Towards aninternationallegallybindinginstrument, the United Nations Environment Assembly requested the United Nations Environment Programme (hereinafter “UNEP”) to convene an intergovernmental negotiating committee to begin its work during the second half of 2022, with the ambition of completing that work by the end of 2024. The first and second sessions of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (hereinafter “INC”), established by1See United Nations Environment Programme, Scenario note for the first session of the intergovernmental negotiating committee to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, UNEP website (27 Nov 2022), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/4131 3/Scenario_note_E.pdf.UNEP to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment(hereinafter “INC-1” and “INC-2”, respectively), took place at Punta del Este Convention and Exhibition Center in Uruguay from 28 November to 2 December 2022, and at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO) Headquarters in Paris, France, from 29 May to 2 June 2023.

During the proceedings of INC-1 and INC-2, several delegations and contact groups, including those from States and regions including China, Argentina, Latin America and the Caribbean,2See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 28 November 2022, ISSD website (10 Dec 2022), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marineenvironment-negotiating-committee-inc1-daily-report-28nov2022.South Africa, Senegal,3See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 30 November 2022, ISSD website (10 Dec 2022), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marineenvironment-negotiating-committee-inc1-daily-report-30nov2022.India, the Philippines,4See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 31 May 2023,ISSD website (7 Jun 2023), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marine-environmentnegotiating-committee-inc2-daily-report-31may2023;and Contact Group 2,5See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 1 June 2023, ISSD website (7 Jun 2023), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marine-environment-negotiatingcommittee-inc2-daily-report-1jun2023;called for the consideration of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (hereinafter “CBDR Principle”) in their general statements and discussions regarding the scope, objectives, and options for the structure of the instrument. These proposals represent the political will of some participating governments and should garner attention from the international community. However, there is no getting around the fact that the CBDR Principle has, thus far, been explicitly applicable only in the context of climate change. There remains a debate on whether this principle should be applicable to plastic pollution,particularly in the marine environment, which requires further exploration. To address this issue, this paper will embark on a two-fold journey. First, we will delve into the origins and implications of the CBDR Principle and provide a summary of its reflection and embodiment outside the field of climate change. Subsequently,we will conduct an in-depth analysis of the applicability of the CBDR Principle in the context of marine plastic pollution and provide insights into the specific ways it might be incorporated into future international instruments addressing plastic pollution.

II. Origins and Implications of the CBDR Principle

The CBDR Principle has gone through a significant period of development and intensive transformation, ultimately evolving to become a fundamental principle in the realm of climate change. In this section, the term “origins” refers to the evolution of the CBDR Principle specifically within the field of climate change,and the term “implications” refers to the essential concepts embodied by the CBDR Principle, namely, “common interests” and “substantive fairness”.6See JI Hua, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and International Climate Change Legal Regime, China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2022, p. 64-72.

A.OriginsoftheCBDRPrinciple

The evolution of the CBDR Principle can be categorized into three stages:Initial formation, concrete establishment, and further development.

1. Initial Formation of the CBDR Principle

It is widely acknowledged in the academic community that the CBDR Principle began to take shape after the emergence of international environmental law. The birth of international environmental law was marked by the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm and the adoption of theDeclarationofthe UnitedNationsConferenceontheHumanEnvironment(hereinafter “Stockholm Declaration”). For the first time,7See LIN Canling, et al., The Emergence and Development of International Environmental Law, People’s Court Press, 2006, p. 50. (in Chinese)theStockholmDeclarationintroduced the concepts of common and differentiated responsibilities in the field of the environment. For instance, theStockholmDeclarationprovided that “the protection and improvement of the human environment is a major issue which affects the wellbeing of peoples and economic development throughout the world; it is the urgent desire of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments”8Art. 2 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.and that “the environmental policies of all States should enhance and not adversely affect the present or future development potential of developing countries…”9Art. 11 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.Despite the cautiously phrased expression, it indeed implies the emergence of the concepts of “common responsibility” and “differentiated responsibility” at the time. However,the CBDR Principle was not firmly established during that period but rather in the “initial formation” stage. This was primarily due to the fact that the developing States, which later became key proponents of the CBDR Principle, had different priorities during the Conference on the Human Environment. Their focus was more on shaping a new international economic order rather than global environmental cooperation. Consequently, the conditions for solidifying the CBDR Principle were not yet ripe at that time.10See KOU Li, Common-but-differentiated Responsibilities: Its Evolution, Attributes and Functions, Science of Law (Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law),Vol. 4, p. 95-103. (in Chinese)

2. Establishment of the CBDR Principle

The CBDR Principle was explicitly set out in theUnitedNationsFramework ConventiononClimateChange(hereinafter “UNFCCC”), which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 May 1992 and opened for signature at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June that same year, as well as in theRioDeclarationon EnvironmentandDevelopment(hereinafter “RioDeclaration”) adopted during the conference. It is provided in the preamble of UNFCCC that “… Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all States and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions …”11Preamble of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.Similarly,theRioDeclarationstates that “… In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities…”12Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.

In the meantime, theRioDeclarationalso mentions that “… The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.”13Ibid.This provision highlights the historical responsibility of developed States in addressing climate change, while also recognizing the current varying circumstances between developed and developing States. The two key elements of “historical responsibility” and “national capacity” embodied therein are seen as the foundational prerequisites for the application of the CBDR Principle.

In a nutshell, the provisions of the UNFCCC and theRioDeclarationreflect the global community’s perspective and stance towards climate change during the 1990s. They mark a period when countries were deepening their understanding of the CBDR Principle and seeking “substantive fairness” in addressing climate change. Regrettably, both instruments, while acknowledging the CBDR Principle,did not provide more detailed and specific provisions on that basis, leaving room for further development in the practical application of the CBDR Principle.

3. Further Development of the CBDR Principle

The CBDR Principle was made concrete in theKyotoProtocol, which was adopted at the third session of the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC in 1997. In simple terms, theKyotoProtocoldelineated greenhouse gas reduction commitments for developed States while not imposing mandatory reduction obligations on developing States. The protocol’s dichotomy approach, characterized by strict adherence to the CBDR Principle, ignited substantial disagreements and more heated debates between developed and developing States regarding the principle’s applicability, surpassing previous levels of contention.

TheParisAgreement, adopted in 2015, set a clear course and objectives for global collaboration in addressing climate change beyond 2020. It is widely recognized as a holistically balanced, long-lasting, and effective international climate accord that is legally binding.14ZHU Lisong & GAO Xiang, From Copenhagen to Paris: Changes and Developments in the International Climate Regime, Tsinghua University Press, 2017, p. 247. (in Chinese)While the CBDR Principle is explicitly mentioned multiple times in theParisAgreement, its content has evolved to include elements of “common but differentiated responsibilities, respective capabilities, and different national circumstances”.15ZHOU Chen, On the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Principle In the Context of Carbon Neutrality, Wuhan University Journal (Philosophy & Social Science), Vol. 2, p.152-163 (2023). (in Chinese)The previous dichotomy approach established by theKyotoProtocol, which mandated emission reductions for developed States and voluntary participation for developing States, has transitioned into a new model based on “nationally determined contributions”, where all parties are included in the scope of greenhouse gas emissions reduction efforts.16Art. 4 of the Paris Agreement.Following theParis Agreement, theGlasgowClimatePact, adopted at the twenty-sixth session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, maintained a steadfast stance on the CBDR Principle, and it reviewed and reaffirmed the provisions related to the CBDR Principle outlined in theParisAgreement.17United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Glasgow Climate Pact,UNFCCC website (15 Dec 2022), https://unfccc.int/documents/310475.

B.ImplicationsoftheCBDRPrinciple

It is evident from the above that the CBDR Principle itself is constantly evolving and changing. Some scholars argue that, over the years, there has been a significant shift in the implications of the CBDR Principle, particularly in relation to its two elements: “Common responsibility” and “differentiated responsibility”.18See SHI Yubing, Climate Change and International Shipping: The Regulatory Framework for the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Brill Nijhoff, 2017, p. 86-89.However, this paper holds that the essence of the CBDR Principle has not undergone substantial changes. As indicated by the name itself, the principle encompasses two aspects - common and differentiated responsibility -which directly convey the implications of the CBDR Principle, namely, “common interests” and “substantive fairness”.19Supra note 6, JI Hua. (in Chinese)

1. Common Interests Embodied in Common Responsibility

As previously mentioned, the concept of “common responsibility” initially appeared in theStockholmDeclarationand was further acknowledged in subsequent instruments such as the UNFCCC and theKyotoProtocol. The primary rationale behind advocating for common responsibility among States in the realms of both environment and climate change lies in the holistic nature of Earth’s ecosystem. Any harm inflicted on a component within this interconnected system will inevitably have repercussions on the entire ecosystem. Furthermore, there exists a direct correlation between the common interests of humanity and Earth’s ecosystem as a whole. Therefore, issues related to the environment and climate change have impacts on humanity at the level of common interests. It is for this reason that all States need to assume common responsibility for these issues.

2. Substantive Fairness Embodied in Differentiated Responsibility

In the pursuit of substantive fairness, the CBDR Principle introduces the concept of “differentiated responsibility”. According to Principle 7 of theRio Declaration, this differentiated responsibility arises from two main sources:the historical responsibility of a State and its current national capacity. As previously mentioned, these two key elements are considered prerequisites for the application of the CBDR Principle.20Supra note 12.Since the Industrial Revolution, long-standing industrialized developed States have caused unprecedented destruction to Earth’s ecosystem, which is a major contributor to the current environmental status. In response to the environmental damage within their own borders, these developed States have started relocating high-pollution and high-emission industries to areas outside their borders, shifting pollution and emissions to developing States.Additionally, developed States, albeit having a relatively small population in the global context, constitute the major contributors to the current global environmental pollution. Based on the Polluter-pays Principle, developed States should take historical responsibility for environmental damage. On the other hand, developing States, constrained by their current national capacity, have limited capabilities for environmental governance after undertaking the pollution and emissions transferred to them from developed States. They often struggle to fully express their intentions through their own resources. Furthermore, many developing States are populous nations, and to protect their people’s livelihoods, they must further industrialize to boost economic growth. Therefore, to achieve substantive fairness between developing and developed States, it is essential for these nations to shoulder differentiated responsibilities.

Considering the varying capacities and unique national circumstances of developing States, theParisAgreementacknowledges the challenges these nations encounter when it comes to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, it offers relatively flexible provisions for developing States, essentially allowing the practical application of differentiated responsibilities. Beyond the previously mentioned nationally determined contributions, theParisAgreementalso includes detailed provisions concerning financial support, technology transfer, and capacitybuilding. Notably, it provides concrete measures for strengthening capacitybuilding efforts.21See Art. 11 of the Paris Agreement.

III. Reflection and Embodiment of the CBDR Principle Outside the Field of Climate Change

While the CBDR Principle initially emerged and evolved within the realm of climate change, there exist treaties and precedents that can reflect and embody the CBDR Principle in fields beyond climate change.

A.ConventiononBiologicalDiversity

Since 1988, when British ecologist Norman Myers first identified tropical rainforest “hotspots” with exceptional levels of plant endemism and serious levels of habitat loss,22See Norman Myers, Threatened biotas: “Hot spots” in tropical forests, Environmentalist,Vol. 8:3, p. 187-208 (1988).multiple intergovernmental organizations have worked for years to identify a total of 36 “biodiversity hotspots” by 2016. These hotspots are recognized as Earth’s most biologically rich—yet threatened—terrestrial regions.23See Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund, Biodiversity Hotspots Defined, CEPF website (15 Dec 2022), https://www. cepf.net/our-work/biodiversity-hotspots/hotspots-defined.

Figure 1 Global Distribution Map of Biodiversity Hotspots24Figure 1 is a map of the global distribution of biodiversity hotspots produced by Kellee Koenig, see https://zenodo.org/record/4311850#.Y66f FfVBze9。

The global distribution of biodiversity hotspots reveals that the majority of biodiversity is currently found in developing States across South-East Asia, Africa,and South America. However, due to capacity constraints, developing States often struggle to effectively protect their biodiversity. Additionally, in the realm related to biodiversity utilization like biotechnology, it wasn’t until the 21st century that significant advancements emerged in these nations.25See The World Academy of Science, Biotechnology: A growing field in the developing world, TWAS website (15 Dec 2022), https://twas.org/article/biotechnology-growing-fielddeveloping-world.Historically, the utilization of biodiversity was primarily the domain of developed States. As a consequence,many of these nations have already witnessed substantial losses in their own biodiversity. Therefore, developed States, owing to their historical responsibility,have a duty to financially support biodiversity conservation efforts in developing States and to share the benefits reaped from utilizing biodiversity with developing States.

Although the CBDR Principle is not explicitly mentioned in theConvention onBiologicalDiversity(hereinafter “CBD”), it is implicitly reflected and embodied in the CBD’s text. For instance, the preamble of CBD states that “Affirming that the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind”.Article 20, paragraph 2 thereof provides that “The developed country Parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing measures which fulfill the obligations of this Convention and to benefit from its provisions”.26Preamble, Article 20 (2) of the Convention on Biological Diversity.Additionally, Articles 15, 16, and 19 of the CBD, which address access to genetic resources, access to and transfer of technology, and handling of biotechnology and distribution of its benefits, respectively, effectively manifest the differentiation in responsibility between developed and developing States. Some scholars argue that the “Rio Principles”, including the CBDR Principle, should serve as the foundational pillars of the CBD framework, emphasizing that developed States should acknowledge their historical responsibility regarding biodiversity loss.27See Viviana Mu?oz Tellez, Proposals to Advance the Negotiations of the Post 2020 Biodiversity Framework, the South Centre website, (15 Dec 2022), https://www.southcentre.int/policy-brief-90-march-2021/.

B.GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade

Within numerous agreements of the World Trade Organization (hereinafter “WTO”), developing States are offered more lenient obligations, such as special preferences, technical assistance, and phased implementation.28See Joost Pauwelyn, The End of Differential Treatment for Developing Countries?Lessons from the Trade and Climate Change Regimes, Review of European Community &International Environmental Law, Vol. 22:1, p. 29-41 (2013).In the realm of trade mechanisms, it can be said that the WTO acknowledges the disparities in national capacity and development needs between developing and developed States, and as a result, grants them correspondingly “differentiated” obligations.Some scholars argue that developed States should shoulder “a moral responsibility to pay a disproportionate share of the costs”.29See Robyn Eckersley, Understanding the interplay between the climate and trade regimes,Climate and Trade Polici es in a Post-2012 World, United Nations Environment Programme,2009, p. 11-18.This perspective stems from the fact that developed States have historically reaped significant benefits from trade, while developing States face considerably higher costs in conducting trade activities.These costs can be attributed, in part, to historical actions such as the colonization perpetrated by developed States against developing States. In other words,developed States bear a certain level of “historical responsibility” for the elevated costs associated with trade activities in developing States.

The CBDR Principle is also reflected and embodied in theGeneralAgreement onTariffsandTrade(hereinafter “GATT”). For instance, Article XXXVI of the GATT mentions that “… (c) noting, that there is a wide gap between standards of living in less-developed countries and other countries; (d) recognizing that individual and joint action is essential to further the development of the economies of less-developed contracting parties and to bring about a rapid advance in the standards of living in these countries; … ”, and that “… (c) have special regard to the trade interests of less-developed contracting parties when considering the application of other measures permitted under this Agreement to meet particular problems …”30Arts. 36, 37 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.Additionally, provisions within theDecisiononDifferential&More FavorableTreatment,Reciprocity&FullerParticipationofDevelopingCountries,adopted in the Tokyo Round in 1979, also reflect and embody the CBDR Principle to some extent.

C.AdvisoryOpinionNo.17oftheInternationalTribunalfortheLawof theSeaontheResponsibilitiesandObligationsofStatesSponsoring PersonsandEntitieswithRespecttoActivitiesintheArea

Advisory Opinion No. 17 of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea(hereinafter “ITLOS”) on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area (hereinafter “Advisory Opinion No. 17”) was requested by the Council of the International Seabed Authority and submitted to ITLOS on 6 May 2010. In addressing the question “What are the legal responsibilities and obligations of States Parties to the Convention with respect to the sponsorship of activities in the Area”, ITLOS provided explanations in Part VII “Interests and needs of developing States” of the advisory opinion.

In the Advisory Opinion, ITLOS first clarified that the general provisions concerning the responsibilities and liability of the sponsoring State apply equally to all sponsoring States, whether developing or developed. This is to prevent the spread of sponsoring States “of convenience”. ITLOS also noted that these observations “do not exclude that rules setting out direct obligations of the sponsoring State could provide for different treatment for developed and developing sponsoring States.”31See International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), ITLOS website (15 Dec 2022), https://itlos.org/main/cases/list-ofcases/case-no-17/.However, in the Advisory Opinion, ITLOS only mentioned the theoretical basis for such “differentiated” treatment, which stems from provisions in theUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)concerning the facilitation of activities in the Area by developing States and special consideration for their interests and needs, as found in the preamble, Article 140(1),Article 148, among others. In other words, concerning the issue of States assuming sponsoring responsibilities for persons or entities with respect to activities in the Area, ITLOS extends preferential treatment to developing States, primarily considering their inadequate capabilities while leaving out of consideration the historical responsibilities of developed States akin to those discussed in the context of climate change or as mentioned in CBD and GATT. It is important to note that the reference to “capabilities” by ITLOS “is only a broad and imprecise reference to the differences in developed and developing States. What counts in a specific situation is the level of scientific knowledge and technical capability available to a given State in the relevant scientific and technical fields.”32Ibid.

IV. Applicability of the CBDR Principle in International Legislation on Marine Plastic Pollution

A.TheFieldofMarinePlasticPollutionMeetstheElementsforthe ApplicationoftheCBDRPrinciple

As noted earlier, the elements for the application of the CBDR Principle include two key aspects: “developed States bearing historical responsibility for environmental issues” and “differing capabilities between developed and developing States.” The development situation of marine plastic pollution aligns closely with these two requirements.

1. The Emergence of Marine Plastic Pollution Largely Attributable to the Historical Responsibility of Developed States

According to a report by UNEP, “Of the seven billion tonnes of plastic waste generated globally so far, less than 10 per cent has been recycled. Millions of tonnes of plastic waste are lost to the environment,” and “nearly 80% of global annual riverine plastic emissions into the ocean, which range between 0.8 and 2.7 million tonnes per year, with small urban rivers amongst the most polluting.”33United Nations Environment Programme, Our planet is choking on plastic, UNEP website(15 Dec 2022), https://www.unep.org/interactives/beat-plastic-pollution/?gclid=EAIaIQobC hMIrur3y62m_AIVDJ1LBR24GQ5dEAAYASAAEgJBTfD_BwE.With regard to the increasingly serious situation of marine plastic pollution, landbased plastic waste constitutes a major contributor to marine plastic pollution, in particular marine microplastic pollution. Over 80 per cent of marine microplastics originate from land-based plastic waste.34See Hrissi K. Karapanagioti, Ioannis K. Kalavrouziotis: Microplastics in Water and Wastewater, translated by AN Lihui, et al., China Environment Publishing Group, 2022, p. 1.(in Chinese)

Compared to developing States, developed States exhibit extremely high per capita plastic waste generation. According to data from Kara Lavender Law et al. in 2020, in 2016, the United States population generated the world’s largest amount of plastic waste, as did its annual per capita plastic waste production, surpassing 130 kilograms per person per year. The European Union, despite having a population roughly 40% that of China, still generated more plastic waste than China in total.Additionally, States like the United Kingdom, Germany, and South Korea also showed notably high per capita plastic waste production.35See Kara Lavender Law et al., The United States’ contribution of plastic waste to land and ocean, Science Advances, Vol. 6:44, eabd0288 (2020).

Table 1 Ranking of Annual per Capita Plastic Waste Production in Selected Countries, 201636Table 1 was produced by this paper based on data from the paper The United States’contribution of plastic waste to land and ocean by Kara Lavender Law et al.

The 1970s and 1980s saw increasingly stringent environmental policies in developed States in response to progressively worsening environmental issues.These States, faced with high waste disposal costs, chose to export their waste to developing States in order to avoid the problem of waste disposal. As the National Academy of Sciences highlighted in its 2022 reportReckoningwiththeU.S.Rolein GlobalOceanPlasticWaste, “Internationally, advanced economies externalize the cost of waste management by exporting plastic waste to less advanced economies,who ultimately bear the brunt of the economic, social, and environmental costs of plastic waste. Before 2018, the United States exported most of its plastic waste to China. After China banned most plastic waste imports, the United States diverted its exported waste to other Southeastern Asian countries.”37National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Reckoning with the U.S. Role in Global Ocean Plastic Waste, The National Academies Press, 2022, p. 30.

On 18 July 2017, the General Office of the State Council issued theImplementationPlanforProhibitingtheEntryofForeignGarbageandAdvancing theReformoftheSolidWasteImportAdministrationSystem(hereinafter “Waste Ban”), marking China’s official ban on the entry of “foreign waste”. Prior to this,China was the largest destination for “foreign waste” worldwide, and plastic waste was a vital part of it. According to the import and export data from 2000 to 2004 and 2013 to 2017 in the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), Hong Kong, China, the United States, Japan, and Germany had long been among the top exporters of plastic waste to China, which means that China had long served as a “plastic waste collection pool” for developed States.

Note that, in spite of the Hong Kong region’s longstanding high ranking in the list of countries (regions) exporting plastic waste to China, as shown in Tables 2 and 3, much of this exported plastic waste was actually transshipped locally within Hong Kong. By comparing the import and export data of plastic waste in Hong Kong from 2013 to 2017, it becomes evident that Hong Kong had played a part in processing and handling a portion of the imported plastic waste, which still originally came from developed States including the United States, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Table 2 China’s Plastic Waste Import Data in 2000-2004 (unit: 10,000 tons)38Tables 2-6 were produced by this paper based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), with the data retained to two decimal places.

Table 3 China’s Plastic Waste Import Data in 2013-2017 (unit: 10,000 tons)

United Kingdom 21.91 27.58 19.88 25.2 14.39 108.96

Table 4 Hong Kong’s Imports of Plastic Waste and Exports to the Chinese Mainland, 2013-2017 (unit: 10,000 tons)

Following China’s implementation of the Waste Ban, developed States shifted their focus to Southeast Asian nations as new destinations for exporting plastic waste in an attempt to transfer the cost of waste disposal. According to a report by Greenpeace, the global share of waste plastic imports from ASEAN countries rose dramatically from 5.38% in 2016 to 27% in 2018.39Greenpeace, Southeast Asia’s Struggles against the Plastic Waste Trade, Greenpeace website, (15 Dec 2022), https://www.greenpeace.org/malaysia/publication/1905/southeastasias-struggle-against-the-plastic-waste-trade/.For instance, Vietnam and Malaysia experienced a sharp and almost exponential rise in their imports of plastic waste from 2015 to 2018, with the waste source countries remaining developed States. It is worth noting that Malaysia also implemented a number of restrictive policies on plastic waste imports in 2018, which contributed to a decrease in the total amount of plastic waste it imported compared to 2017.

Table 5 Vietnam’s Plastic Waste Imports before and after China’s Introduction of Waste Ban (unit: 10,000 tons)

Table 6 Malaysia’s Plastic Waste Imports before and after China’s Introduction of Waste Ban (unit: 10,000 tons)

Undoubtedly, the import and export of plastic waste is a commercial activity in itself. However, the practice adopted by developed States of shifting the responsibility for waste plastic disposal to developing States is essentially an attempt to evade their environmental responsibility. Taking the United States alone as an example, albeit having only 4% of the world’s total population, it produced 17% of the world’s plastic waste in 2016, most of which was exported to developing States.40Supra note 37, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, p. 50.This influx of plastic waste into developing States has led to severe disruptions in their ecological balance, exacerbating local plastic pollution,which, in turn, contributes to the further deterioration of the global ecosystem’s health. It can be argued that the root cause of the current plastic pollution situation lies precisely in the behavior of developed States seeking to evade and transfer their responsibility.

As discussed earlier, it is evident that some developed States have significantly higher per capita plastic waste production compared to developing States.Furthermore, in an attempt to evade the costs and responsibilities associated with plastic waste disposal, they have transferred these burdens to developing States through plastic waste import and export activities. Such behavior has contributed to the current state of plastic pollution. It follows that some developed States bear a “historical responsibility” for the current state of plastic pollution similar to that in the field of climate change, which is in line with the first element for the application of the CBDR Principle.

2. Large Differences in Capacity between Developed and Developing States to Address Marine Plastic Pollution

From a source perspective, inadequate waste management stands out as the primary driver of plastic pollution.41See United Nations Environment Programme, Plastic Science, UNEP website, (27 Nov 2022), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/41263/Plastic_Science_E.pdf.Waste management correlates positively with a State’s economic capacity and overall governance capabilities. Additionally,addressing marine plastic pollution involves a range of activities that largely depend on a State’s capabilities, including the recycling and disposal of land-based plastic waste, as well as monitoring, collection, and analysis of microplastics in the oceans. However, the capacity of developed and developing States to implement international environmental instruments varies from each other due to their differing levels of development and varying levels of environmental awareness among their populations.42See SUN Kai, Global Marine Plastic Pollution and Its Countermeasures, Governance, Vol.15, p. 44-48. (in Chinese)To illustrate, when it comes to microplastic pollution in the oceans, there is still uncertainty surrounding the sources and actual quantity of microplastics entering the marine environment. Furthermore, a more reliable method for dealing with microplastics has yet to be developed.43See SHANG Shengmei: Pollution Status of Marine Microplastics and Countermeasures,Resources Economization & Environmental Protection, Vol. 2, p. 83-86. (in Chinese)

In UNEA Resolution 5/14 entitled “End plastic pollution: Towards an international legally binding instrument” and the concept note for INC-1, there are multiple instances where it emphasizes “taking into account national circumstances and capabilities” and “taking into account, among other things, the principles of theRioDeclaration, as well as national circumstances and capabilities”. It also calls for the intergovernmental negotiating committee to engage in discussions regarding capacity building, technology transfer, and financial support.44Supra note 1, UNEP; United Nations Environment Programme, End plastic pollution:towards an international legally binding instrument, UNEP website (27 Nov 2022),https://documents-d ds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/K22/007/33/pdf/K2200733.pdf?OpenElement.

Hence, in tackling marine plastic pollution, it is crucial to prioritize the needs of developing States. Developed States should not only address their own plastic pollution issues but also enhance their assistance to developing States in terms of technology, funding, and capacity building.45See UNEP, General Statement by the Delegation of China at the First Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to Develop an International Legally Binding Instrument on Plastic Pollution, UNEP website, https://apps1.unep.org/resolutions/uploads/china_inc-1_statements_0_0.pdf. (in Chinese)It can be contended that there exists a significant disparity in the capacity of developing and developed States to manage marine plastic pollution, thereby fulfilling the second element for the application of the CBDR Principle.

B.ThePurposeofInternationalLegislationonMarinePlasticPollution AlignswiththeImplicationsoftheCBDRPrinciple

As previously discussed, the implications of the CBDR Principle encompass two elements: “common interests” and “substantial fairness”. The primary objective of international legislation on marine plastic pollution is to tackle this global issue and safeguard the global environment, all while considering the varying development needs and capacity disparities among developing States. This implies that international legislation on marine plastic pollution aligns closely with the CBDR Principle.

1. “Common Interests” in International Legislation on Marine Plastic Pollution

The interdependence of humans and the environment underscores the vital need to protect both. Preserving the environment is, fundamentally, preserving the essence of human survival. Consequently, a joint global effort is imperative to progressively enhance and restore the living environment, while confronting the challenges collectively.

Plastics, as new polymer materials that emerged in the last century, have gained popularity due to their stability. However, it is precisely these characteristics that make plastics challenging in the environment because they don’t readily break down but rather accumulate over time. Even plastics labeled as “degradable” will take a considerable amount of time to degrade under strict degradation conditions,and the ultimate extent of degradation depends on the type and quality of the plastic itself.46See JIN Yan, et al., Advance in the degradation of biodegradable plastics in different environments, Chinese Journal of Biotechnology, Vol. 5, p.1784-1808 (2021).In the realm of marine plastic pollution, the prevailing issue is microplastic pollution. Current research indicates that microplastics have been detected in surface waters and seafloor sediments across various marine regions.47See Ian Kane, et al., Seafloor microplastic hotspots controlled by deep-sea circulation,Science, Vol. 368:6495, p. 1140-1145 (2020).

Figure 2 Global distribution of marine microplastics48Figure 2 is a map of marine microplastic concentrations produced by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the United States, see https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/b296879cc1984fda833a8acc93e31476/page/Page/?views=Map-Viewer%2CDisplay-Filters.

Plastic pollution poses multidimensional and deep-seated threats to the marine environment. Firstly, microorganisms and algae can attach to and grow on the surface of plastics. Due to ocean currents, these plastics can be easily carried across borders, allowing foreign organisms to invade and destroy the habitats of native organisms in the affected areas. Secondly, microplastics, being very small in size,can be mistakenly ingested by marine organisms.49See XIA Bing, et al., Research Progress on Microplastics Pollution in Marine Fishery Water and Their Biological Effects, Progress in Fishery Sciences, Vol. 3, p. 178-180 (2019).Once ingested, they accumulate within the marine food chain, eventually making their way into the human body when humanity fish and consume seafood.50See Chukwuma Muanya, Okra, Aloe employed to filter microplastics out of wastewater, the Guardian (31 Mar 2022), https://guardian.ng/features/health/okra-aloe-employed-to-filtermicroplastics-out-of-wastewater/.Research has found microplastics in human blood, and although scholars believe that the exact effects on human health are still uncertain, the World Health Organization acknowledges that there is a higher likelihood of human absorption of tiny microplastics.51See WHO, WHO calls for more research into microplastics and a crackdown on plastic pollution, WHO website (22 Aug 2019), https://www.who.int/zh/news-room/detail/22-08-2019-who-calls-for-more-research-into-microplastics-and-a-crackdown-on-plasticpollution. (in Chinese)Additionally, marine life often ingests by mistake undegraded plastics, which they cannot digest, leading to their eventual death.

The oceans and seas constitute a crucial element within earth’s ecosystem,and the responsibility for safeguarding the planet’s ecological environment is a shared obligation among all States. No State can shirk that duty. As XI Jinping has articulated, “Humanity is a community with a shared future, and thus protecting the environment is a challenge and a duty which all of us around the globe must face together.”52XI Jinping, Pushing China’s Development of an Ecological Civilization to a New Stage,Fendou, Vol. 2019:3, p. 1-16.Plastic pollution is gradually eroding the stability of marine ecosystems and potentially jeopardizing human health and safety. Consequently,the international community must take collective responsibility for addressing this issue. Some scholars argue that incorporating the Full Life Cycle Approach (FLCA)could garner support for the CBDR Principle in future instruments. However, it poses challenges in accurately allocating responsibilities among States with varying national circumstances and capabilities.53See WANG Sen, International law-making process of combating plastic pollution: Status Quo, debates and prospects, Marine Policy, Vol. 147, 105376 (2023).Hence, in the subsequent negotiations regarding international instruments on plastic pollution, there is a need for more indepth discussions on topics such as national capacities.

2. “Substantive Fairness” in International Legislation on Marine Plastic Pollution

Developed States’ transfer of significant amounts of plastic waste to developing States substantially reduces their costs associated with waste disposal and also sidesteps the potential environmental ramifications that might emerge during the waste disposal process within their own territories. In contrast, developing States,albeit with limited benefits from the utilization of plastic waste, are often unable to avoid the spread of contamination during the waste disposal process due to their restricted capacities, leading to direct damage to their domestic environments. As discussed earlier, the elements of “historical responsibility” and “national capacity” in the context of marine plastic pollution have been elucidated. These two elements are also two determinants in the practical implementation of substantive fairness.Therefore, there is potential for the realization of substantive fairness in the realm of marine plastic pollution.

Nonetheless, this practical implementation may need to be underpinned by thorough scientific analysis and assessment. In light of the current state of negotiations, as this paper holds, UNEP can take a page from the regulatory model seen in theParisAgreementfor future international instruments on plastic pollution. Building upon a scientific analysis and assessment of the historical responsibility, national capacity, and unique national circumstances, UNEP can differentiate between States with greater responsibility for plastic pollution,particularly in the marine environment, and those significantly affected by it.Also, specific provisions can be made for the notification and implementation of nationally determined contributions, technology transfer, financial support, and capacity-building to assign responsibilities to various States. The aim is to finalize the implementation of substantive fairness, which will be conducive to the actual management of plastic pollution.

V. Conclusion

Notwithstanding an absence of the CBDR Principle being explicitly listed as a general principle in existing practices outside the field of climate change,the specific provisions therein do, to some extent, reflect and embody the CBDR Principle. There are also some scholars arguing that the CBDR Principle can be extended to fields beyond climate change. By delving into the essence of the CBDR Principle, treaty practices, and precedents, along with an analysis of the two main elements of the CBDR Principle, it becomes evident that introducing the CBDR Principle into the governance of plastic pollution, where developed States bear historical responsibility, is feasible. In the opinion of this paper, the proposal made by certain State delegations during the INC-1 and INC-2 to consider incorporating the CBDR Principle into international legislation on plastic pollution is wellfounded, both theoretically and practically.

However, the current progress of negotiations reveals that the application of the CBDR Principle must be carefully considered in light of various factors.Notably, given the divergent political wills between developed and developing States, reaching consensus among the two major camps poses a significant challenge. As such, whether the CBDR principle can ultimately be integrated into new international instruments hinges on the “zero draft” international instrument being prepared by INC Chair Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, as well as the upcoming third session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-3) scheduled to convene in Nairobi, Kenya from 13 to 19 November 2023, and subsequent negotiations.

Translators: CHEN Cong, YAN Lilan

Editor (English): HUANG Yuxin