古希臘神話的詩歌語用學：指涉性虛構和儀式表演[1]

克洛德·伽拉姆

（法國社會科學高等研究院，巴黎）

古希臘神話的詩歌語用學：指涉性虛構和儀式表演[1]

克洛德·伽拉姆

（法國社會科學高等研究院，巴黎）

何為“神話”？它是一種非指涉性的虛構么？在古希臘，“神話”通常借助詩歌形式，特別是史詩、歌唱詩和悲劇來呈現，本文以“詩歌語用學”為理論框架，來探討這些詩歌形式賦予英雄時代敘事的表演價值以及詩歌表演如何融入儀式實踐當中。通過詩歌表演這一媒介，過去的英雄世界與當下的儀式實踐相關聯，于是英雄世界被轉變為具有指涉性的虛構。這一世界既不是現代意義上的神話，也不是歷史，而是以象征以及實踐的形式對在場的公民共同體發揮直接的作用。

語用學；虛構；神話；詩歌表演

在安東尼王朝統治末期的第二次智術師運動中，懷疑論哲學家塞克斯都·恩披里可（Sextus Empiricus）似乎給神話下了一個現代的定義：歷史（historía）是對已經發生的事情（gegonóta）即真實事件的展示（ékthesis），與之相對的是神話（m?thos），后者所展示出的行動并非已經發生，而是“虛假的”（pragmáton agenéton kaì pseud?n ékthesis）。實際上，歷史與神話在結構類型上顯而易見的對立，以及由此形成的事實敘事與虛構敘事之間的對立，引出了第三個術語：plásma；詞源學意義上的虛構，即拉丁語的f ingere，意為“加工、制作”，這個詞在字義上確切對應于古希臘詞pláttein，即“塑造”之意。因此，在“歷史”與“神話”之間，“虛構”所對應的敘事，與并未發生的行動聯系在一起，但這些行動卻像是已經發生過的，并通過模仿的方式得以呈現。這種似真/逼真（le vraisemble）來源于虛構/加工（f iction/fa?on）中的“好似”（comme si），它將會與（歷史的）真實性聯合起來，以此來對抗謊言一般的神話。[2]參見Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 263—264；關于拉丁語的類似情況，可以參見B. Cassin, L’Effet Sophistique (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 481—484，有關拉丁語中“fabula”（寓言）、“argumentum”（法律證據）與“historia”之間在敘述層面上的區別，尤請參見Quintilien, Institution Oratoire 1, 8, 18—21。甚至，“好似”在我們有關人文學科領域的知識的構建中也產生了影響，即圖形構建中的“好似”，以及表現性加工與話語性加工中的“好似”，這方面內容請特別參見S. Borutti,“Fiction et construction de l’objet en Anthropologie”, in F. Affergan, S. Boruti, C. Calame, U. Fabietti, M. Kilani, F. Remotti, Figures de l’humain. Les Représentations de l’anthropologie (Paris: éditions de l’ehess, 2003), 88—99。

1. 作為表現式文學創作的虛構[3]原文使用“po(i)étique”一詞，一語雙關，“poétique”指詩學、文學創作，“po?étique”又暗指柏拉圖《會飲》中所指的導向創作的內在動因?！g注

然而，就算此后虛構被“plásma”和“m?thos”所共享，實際上這種敘事性的創作，其概念本身，從根本上講符合了亞里士多德的詩學概念。詩的技藝“tékhne poietiké”被他定義為“mímesis”，是用韻文即悲劇或者英雄敘述詩，來展現戲劇行動的藝術；與柏拉圖將“mímesis”定義為模擬或幻影（simulacres）所不同的是，他認為悲劇和喜劇建立在“m?thos”之上；這個在古風時代被理解為“靈驗的話語”（discours eff icace）的概念，在《詩學》中則被認為是“各種行動的聚合” （súnthesis ou sústasis t?n pragmáton），也就是“情節”。[4]Aristote, Poétique 6, 1449b 24—27（“悲劇所表現的是高貴的行為，并通過高雅的語言來呈現”）以及23, 1459a 17—21（“敘述藝術”，作為一種韻文形式的模仿藝術，在于“如同像悲劇中那樣來組織戲劇性的故事情節”）；關于《詩學》對“m?thos”（神話傳說）的接受，參見：Aristote, Poétique 6, 1450a 22—23以及29—34；試比較：P. Ric?ur, Temps et Récit. Tome I (Paris: éditions du Seuil, 1983), 55—84，他十分細致地對作為詩歌組織架構的“mímesis”中的神話傳說的嵌套做出了分析，同時也分析了柏拉圖作品中的偽裝敘事，參見J.-M. Schaeffer, Pourquoi la Fiction? (Paris: éditions du Seuil, 1999), 42—60。因此，敘述里的虛構/加工被認為是通過詞語來進行的表現。

1.1 在詩歌與歷史之間

不過，在古希臘的詩歌形式中，排除了所有音樂性表演的維度，排除了mélos（它包含了與儀式實踐有關的各種詩歌形式）之后，亞里士多德概念里的詩歌藝術便是純敘事性的了。[5]參見F. Dupont, Aristote ou le vampire du Théatre Occidental (Paris: Aubier, 2007), 39—77。而歷史也在其中有著一席之地，但卻是作為反題！眾所周知，這個將兩者對立的觀點，歷來被援引與評注甚多：“詩人的工作，不是述說將要發生的事情（tà ginómena），而是那些根據逼真性或者必然性會發生的事情（katà tò eikòs è tò anagka?on）。實際上，歷史學家和詩人是不同的（……）前者述說已經發生的事情，后者述說可能發生的事情。這就是為什么詩歌與歷史相比，是一種更哲學更崇高的技藝。詩歌敘述的是普遍的事情，歷史講述的則是個別事件?！盵6]Aristote, Poétique 9, 1451a36—b11以及1451b27—32，可以同時閱讀筆者所做的評論，C. Calame, Pratiques Poétiques de la Mémoire. Représentations de l’espace-temps en Grèce Ancienne (Paris: La Découverte, 2006), 61—64；另參見B. Boulay, “Histoire et Narrativité. Autour des Chapitres 9 et 23 de la Poétique d’Aristote”, Lallies 26 (2006): 171—179；有關“pláttein”與“mímesis”的關系，參見A. Ford, The Origins of Criticism. Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical Greece (Princeton —Oxford: Princeton Unversity Press, 2002), 229—233。因此這將又是一個明確無疑的二元對立？一方面是事實的敘事，另一方面則是虛構的敘事？歷史由特殊（事件）構成，它述說的是一個個事件，而詩歌則述說神話的/想象的創造（la création mythique），因此詩歌是一種虛構。

事實上，兩者的區別要微妙得多；敘事真正的價值并沒有被揭示出來。事實與捏造并不矛盾，事實與似真/逼真（le vraisemblable）相對，或者說與必然以及模仿性的加工技藝相對。然而，正如筆者在別處所示，人們絕口不提亞里士多德之于詩（戲?。┡c歷史之典型差異所做出的評論：如果韻文與散文這兩種聚合（composition，或譯為“創作”）形式之間固有的差別無法區分詩人與史家，那么詩人也可以表現已經發生的行動（genómena），而這本來是史家的任務。如果詩人的技藝真的是模仿性的，如果詩人的任務是對行動加以聚合（composer［poie?n］），那么沒有什么能阻止他將（已經發生的）事件嵌入其敘事中，只要這些事件處于似真的、可能發生的層面。一旦被敘述的行動符合敘事的模仿技藝的兩個方面，詩人與史家的角色就要重新分配了。因此，歸根結底，在古典時代的希臘詩學家看來，詩歌的功能具有兩方面：聚合與加工，這種功能將虛構敘事與事實敘事之間的差別變得含糊不清并易受影響，而我們則一直想要區分這種差別。在古典時代的希臘人看來，借助文學創作（po(i)étique）的加工，將捏造變為真實的任務，正屬于逼真性或可能性，以及潛在性；這是一種并非經驗論與事實性的真實，這種真實是所有“神話”敘事中的真實：從荷馬史詩到英雄史詩的最終形式即阿提卡悲劇。

1.2 從似真/逼真到政治功用

詩歌與模仿對上述轉變的操作，恰恰存在于手藝人的加工技藝當中；在亞里士多德限制性的敘事視角中，正是代表性的“poie?n”造就了行動的聚合與安排（súnthesis et sústasis t?n pragmáton），并賦予了“m?thos”敘事意義上的“情節”這一含義。然而，盡管這種敘事邏輯的觀點似乎并不意味著敘事層面的“pláttein”（塑造），但由該動詞引出的名詞（plasma—譯按）早已被挽歌詩人色諾芬尼（Xénophane）所使用。這位來自科勒豐（Colophon）的充滿批判性的詩人被譽為“前蘇格拉底”哲人，這位詩人對詩歌的批評先于柏拉圖一個多世紀；事實上，他還揭示出，荷馬與赫西奧德這兩位神學詩人所做的，是將那些受到譴責的行為歸屬于神。但他也譴責在會飲上吟誦那些包含泰坦、巨人和人馬故事的史詩敘事，這位哲人—詩人所指責的“古人的虛構”（plásmata t?n protéron），并非因為它們出現在奧林坡斯眾神時代之前，具有殘暴特征而不真實，而是因為在那些敘事中“沒什么有用的（“rien d’utile”）。[7]Xénophane frr. 15與13—24 Gentili-Prato；對于敘述加工與詩歌的“poie?n”之間的親屬關系，參見C. Calame, Mythe et Histoire dans l’antiquité Grecque. La Création Symbolique d’une Colonie (Lausanne: Payot, 1996), 29—30,以及C. Calame, Poétique des Mythes dans la Grèce Antique (Paris: Hachette, 2000), 38—42。在宴飲的時候，人們應該在純粹的敘事或是歌頌的話語（m?thoi）中歌唱神以及有福之人（即英雄），以此來宣揚神與英雄各自的美名?！癿?thos”這一術語在此便具有其經典的含義，即具有觀點的（有時也是敘事性的）話語，這具有強烈的語用學特質，動詞“humne?n”（歌唱）的用法涉及宗教儀式上歌頌性敘事嚴格的詩歌與歌唱形式。[8]相關參考書目見拙著C. Calame, Mythe et Histoire dans l’antiquité Grecque. La Création Symbolique d’une Colonie, 29 n. 33。筆者將在下文提到，正是通過其詩歌形式，“虛構”的敘事獲得了其語用學效力，一種既是政治的又是社會的功用。

然而，面對表達觀點的敘事，在這一選擇中，似真性的標準和功用性的標準結合在一起，無論在哲學中，還是在整個修辭傳統中都是決定性的，這種情況一直持續到第二次智術師時代。修辭技藝的傳授，有賴于一系列準備活動，埃里烏斯·特翁（Aelius Théon）便留給我們的一本名為《準備活動》（Progymnasmata，直譯“熱身練習”，是專門為學習修辭設計的—譯注）的教科書。這位亞歷山大里亞的修辭學家，僅用“m?thos”這一術語指稱動物類的寓言，而直接將“敘事”（diégema）等同于講述神與英雄人物的故事。為了使修辭練習恰如其分，寓言將是年輕演講者創作（plásai）的主題；這位修辭學家所編訂的練習，要么受到古人集體創作的寓言集的啟發，要么就是受到那些口耳相傳的寓言故事的啟發。盡管寓言有時是捏造的、不可能的，它們卻能夠令人信服并因此而有用（pithanà kaì ophélima）。對于那些“神話性質的敘事”（muthikaì diegéseis）以及在我們看來好像是“神話”（“mythes”）的敘事也是如此。如果它們顯得像是捏造的或是不可能的，那么就需要批評性地審視敘述的主角、主角的行為、發生的地點、所處的時間、表達方式以及原因。如若美迪亞殺害她自己的孩子的敘事不能讓人信服，那便是因為上述各方面都顯得不逼真（ouk eikós）。在這位修辭學家看來，希羅多德便是如此操作，神話敘事把多多納神諭的起源歸于埃及的鴿子，而希羅多德則認為這些鴿子其實是忒拜的少女，即那些女祭司；柏拉圖在《費德若篇》的開頭也是如此，他借蘇格拉底之口，把伯瑞阿斯（北風之神—譯按）追求奧萊推亞（雅典早期國王厄瑞特烏斯之女—譯按）的故事歸結為是北風呼嘯，這北風刮倒了一位正在和同伴玩耍的少女。[9]Aelius Théon, Progymnasmata 75, 9—76,16與93, 5—96, 10；提及的另外兩個例子參見Hérodote 2, 52—57以及Platon, Phèdre 229c：一個被認為是“真實”（alethés）的“神話故事”（muthológema）！

用似真性來賦予英雄傳說的主角們及其行為某種語用學含義的下一位古人是公元前4世紀的歷史學家埃佛魯斯（éphore）。例如，這位歷史編纂者認為盤踞在德爾菲神廟的大蛇皮同是具有動物般狂暴的人物形象，再比如他把巨人提提俄斯看成一位古老君主的不公正的暴力。[10]éphore, FgrHist. 70 F 31以及34（= Aelius Théon, Progymnasmata 95, 23—96,4）。幾個世紀之后，普魯塔克在關于傳說中的忒修斯—雅典民主制度的創設英雄的傳記開頭如此提示：悲劇詩人和神話書寫讓我們了解過往那遙遠的空間，當我們論及它們的時候，我們應當“用理性的話語（lógos），通過凈化的方式，來解釋虛構（tò muth?des），并用歷史調查（historía）的方式來理解這一虛構”?！断ＥD羅馬名人平行列傳》的作者放聲宣告了他的編纂方式，其意圖再明顯不過了：通過似真/逼真的話語（eikòs lógos）的迂回方式來考察行為，以此來穿越時間；似真/逼真是為了敘述和政治功用，從古希臘人的寬泛意義上來講，就是為了提供英雄的樣板。

1.3 神話與真實的價值

特翁在他所編寫的教科書里，給那些學習修辭術的學生們提供了很多傳奇故事作為素材，在把它們作為范例之前，它們被用在演說中進行討論，不過這些故事本身的真實性，或者說其真實的價值從未被懷疑過；像美迪亞、皮同或者提提俄斯這類形象，盡管他們面目可怖、行為殘忍，但從來沒有人懷疑過他們的歷史真實性。畢竟對修昔底德而言已經如此，而他還被現代人看作是“事件史之父”，甚至還是“實證史學之父”。米諾斯、伯羅普斯、阿伽門農、海倫，他們是希臘世界形成之際最早的主人公，是最早的航海家，他們意欲將希臘人的影響力伸向愛琴海及其東海岸。的確，我們對這些基本知識的了解都來源于一個史詩傳統，這是一個口頭傳統，通常我們將其歸名于荷馬。但是，這種傳統既提供了知識與見證（tekméria）的痕跡，同時也提供了諸多跡象（seme?a），它們植根于過去那些被摧毀的城邦之中。歷史學家的職責（這一點人們往往忽視），仍然是要對這些痕跡與跡象進行考察（skope?n），這有助于使他們所言更令人信服。

這一歷史空間，并不等同于神話領域，也與英雄傳奇的世界不同，但卻類似于“archa?on”或者“tò pálai”，即一個“遙遠的過去”、一個“往昔的時光”。一位修昔底德著作的古代評注家曾給其中這一序言性質的篇章命名為“遠古學”（archéologie），正是這一部分，引領我們從古希臘青銅時代的發端直到希波戰爭的前夜。詩人們與古希臘最早的散文作家們將這一原初時代留給了其廣大聽眾（比如希羅多德），通過他們之口流傳后世，在他們的筆下，以及在那些“súggrama”（專論）的作者批判的文筆下，palaiá與archa?a擺脫了那些可能被稱為“虛構”（muth?des）的內容，成為關乎一種歷史的、事實的真實，但也與一種被似真/逼真性所重塑的歷史的真實聯系在了一起。修昔底德的結論眾所周知：“或許，在聆聽的時候，由于虛構（muth?des）的缺席，那些已經發生的事情（tà genómena）少了一絲吸引力……但倘若人們認為它們是有用的，這已足夠；這些已經發生的事情，在我的筆下將為千秋萬代所擁有，遠甚那些一時的聽眾所喜歡的即興表演?！盵11]特別參見：Thucydide 1, 1, 2; 3, 3; 9, 3—10, 3; 20, 1; 21, 1—2，以及那個著名的段落：22, 4，同時請參見筆者的相關評論C. Calame, Mythe et histoire dans l’antiquité Grecque. La Création Symbolique d’une Colonie, 38—46, 46—57，以及薩義德的即將出版的論文：S. Sa?d, “Muthodes chez Thucydide”, forthcoming。盡管這將使得人們在以后越來越依賴書寫傳統，但所表達的內容再一次變得有說服力。如果修昔底德從沒對特洛伊戰爭的歷史真實性和那些著名的主角們提出質疑，那并不是僅僅因為英雄時代的行為屬于一個共同體的歷史，更是因為他們便是當下歷史的奠基與緣由：正如米諾斯在克里特海上所做的一樣，特洛伊戰爭宣告了雅典在愛琴海上的相同作為；在當下的歷史書寫中，這提前宣告了伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的直接起因。這種過去與現在之間的起源學與語用學的關系，正如我們將看到的，遍布所有希臘人的神話。對于我們現代人而言，由于我們的信仰體系與古人并不相同，我們會把這些神話歸入虛構敘事這個現代范疇。

要知道，在公元前4世紀，修辭學大師伊索克拉底曾大量運用當時有關希臘起源的英雄敘事，來為雅典的霸權進行合理性辯護：赫拉克勒斯的時代與赫拉克勒斯后裔的時代，自然包括特洛伊戰爭，隨著時間的推移，還包括父輩所謂的“palaiá”所處的希波戰爭。在《泛雅典娜節頌詞》（Panégyrique）這部有關歷史上雅典美德的作品中，演講家甚至提到了眾神時代。實際上，這篇針對雅典這座“最古老的”（arkhaiotáte）希臘城邦的頌詞不啻為對于起源的種種暗示；伴隨著泛希臘的追求，雅典文明正好吻合了農神德墨忒爾的出現。德墨忒爾出現在阿提卡并被接受，是由于尋找女兒珀爾塞福涅的緣故，這位谷物農事之神不僅答應教會雅典人農耕，更是教會了他們厄琉息斯秘儀，以此期盼一種更美好的生活，以及在此之上的幸福。[12]Isocrate, Panégyrique 26—33；雅典演說家們關于“神話傳說”的用法，請參見筆者在1998年所匯集的大量例證和評論，C. Calame, “M?thos, Lógos et Histoire. Usages du Passé Héro?que dans la Rhétorique Grecque”, L’Homme 147 (1998): 134—142。我們能質疑這一敘事嗎？我們能懷疑它嗎？伴隨著對德墨忒爾之福的記憶，榮耀歸于雅典人，并被注入了一個有關“arkha?a”的神圣傳統之中；人們對德爾菲神諭的贊同，只能更加肯定這種敘述過去之言與展現當下之行之間的融合。而歸根到底具有決定性意義的，則是厄琉息斯秘儀每年所要重復的儀式實踐：在城邦事務的實際操作、有效性以及功能性方面，一個“仍然是當下的現在”被呈現了出來。因此，正是通過儀式實踐，明顯是虛構的敘事（muthódes lógos）在其有效性與社會功用方面，找尋到了真實。

眾所周知，柏拉圖本人也毫不猶豫地通過其筆下的主要人物之口，來吐露他對神話敘事的偏愛。他借蘇格拉底之口，充滿悖論地告訴我們像亞特蘭蒂斯這樣的敘事，并不僅僅是一個加工而成的神話（plastheìs m?thos），它還預示著一個真實的話語（alethinòs lógos）；準確地說，它預示的應當是雅典人將榮耀獻給他們的保護女神之日。[13]Platon, Timée 26e；同時請特別參見：Platon, Gorgias 523a（米諾斯和宙斯之子拉德曼托斯有關靈魂審判的敘事）或者Protagoras 320c（普羅米修斯為人類帶來文明的敘事）；有關柏拉圖的“神話”創作及其所起到的論辯功能，參見：G. Cerri, La Poetica di Platone: Una Teoria Della Comunicazione, 3eéd (Lecce: Argo, 2007)以及C. Calame, Mythe et Histoire dans l’antiquité Grecque. La Création Symbolique d’une Colonie, 27—29, 166—169，該書同時附有大量有關柏拉圖“神話”的參考書目。我們將會注意到，表述所處的語境，不經意間，將話語加工這一概念與當下的情景聯系起來，賦予了一種強烈的語用學上的關聯。

捏造出來的虛構故事，同時也導向了一種似—真（vrai-semblable），但不管是這類故事，還是那些由功利的語用學所支配的所有似真/逼真敘事（récit vraisemblable），它們都在希臘詩歌中打下了深深的烙印。難道還需要重申一遍，正是赫西奧德本人借奧林坡斯的繆斯女神之口說出了以下著名的話語：“我們知道如何敘述（légein）那些捏造的故事，把它們敘述得像真的一樣（etúmoisin homo?a）；如果我們愿意的話，我們還知道如何歌唱（gerúsasthai）真實?！边@些話是對第一人稱的詩人“我”所說的，他在赫利孔山放牧他的綿羊，剛剛自稱“赫西奧德”，這些神圣的話語帶來了及時而雙重的影響：一方面，作為詩歌的創造者（artiépeiai），繆斯女神將她們用詩歌許下的諾言與月桂樹枝的儀式性饋贈聯系在了一起，這樹枝確保了詩人此后能受到祝福；另一方面，作為序曲，行吟詩人“我”，通過對繆斯女神本身的贊歌，的的確確開始了他的神譜贊歌。[14]Hésiode, Théogonie 22—39；這一段落引發了大量的評注，其中請參見B. Lincoln, Theorizing Myth. Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 3—18。該書注釋2提供了其他參考論著，另見拙著C. Calame, Poétique des Mythes en Grèce Antique (Paris: Hachette, 2000), 165 n. 23。受到了繆斯的啟發，神譜性敘事，即在我們看來虛構的敘事，其真實既建立在那神圣的起源上，又建立在表述之中。通過譜系學，我們追溯了眾神的世界，這一世界與史詩的語境之間在語用學上的關系，則由詩歌加工來構建，就如同手藝人靈感迸發的手工作品。[15]參見拙著C. Calame, Poétique des Mythes en Grèce Antique, 38—42，筆者試圖給出既受神靈感應而創作又因詩人的手工操作來完成的作品中那些充滿悖論的術語。

2.（后）現代虛構

古希臘羅馬世界給予了我們一種遙遠的詩歌（但非文學的）文化，然而這種文化所具有的歷史人類學視角，卻用一種批判的方式讓我們回過頭來，審視我們所依賴的范式。有的虛構無法識別某種內在參數，這種參數是能區分虛構話語和事實話語的。對于這類虛構，種種跡象表明，話語的語用性是我們唯一能確認的標準。如果在虛構與事實之間的語言滲透性也無能為力，即任何表述的時間化的、空間化的邏輯推論都無法給虛構性定出一個明確的標準，果真如此，那么正如塞爾（John Searle）所言，“沒有一種文本屬性、句法屬性或是語義屬性可以認定某一文本是虛構作品”，因此虛構敘述便是一種純粹的偽裝，甚至是一種“偽裝游戲”（feintise ludique）。[16]J. R. Searle, Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 65—66 (= trad. fr. par J. Proust, Sens et Expression. Etudes de théorie des Actes de Langage [Paris: Minuit, 1982],143—109)；這一問題請參見G. Genette, Fiction et diction (Paris: Seuil, 1991), 87 (Repris dans Fiction et Diction, Précédé de Introduction à l’architexte [Paris: Seuil, 2004], 143)，以及Shusterman很有見地的觀點：R. Shusterman, “Fiction, réel, référence”, Littérature 123 (2001): 44—55。但是，在這樣的語言游戲中，言語的虛構或者視覺的虛構，將簡化為一種調整心態的簡單能力（une simple capacité de modélisation mentale）？通過其表現性成分，這種虛構還能激起接受者的審美體驗嗎？還能滿足感性的注意力嗎？即它還符合虛構的浸入能力（capacité d’immersion f ictionnelle）嗎？這種虛構應該被重新導向一種表現層面上的模仿式浸入能力（une capacité d’immersion mimétique de l’ordre de la représentation）嗎？或許既來自虛構話語的產生者也來自其接受者？[17]在這里通過問題的形式所表達的觀點，請參見J.-M. Schaeffer, Pourquoi la fi ction?, 327—335，該書書名便用了疑問句。是否可以如此認為：存在一種虛構性（f ictionnalité）的能力（compétence），它由創造者與大眾共同分享，即虛構同時具有創造與接收兩方面的能力？

如此說來，“在表現活動的游戲性使用里”，虛構故事僅擁有一種內在功能，一種審美滿足的功能。即便如此斷言，我也不得不再次提及《詩學》的開頭。在亞里士多德看來，詩歌創作的藝術，在人的摹仿天性里找到源頭；同樣也正是因為這一摹仿能力使得人區別于其他動物，而這種能力從人誕生之初便顯露出來了，并伴隨著作為人類的我們在摹仿中所得到的快感（khaírein）。[18]Aristote, Poétique 4, 1448b 4—19；引文出自J.-M. Schaeffer, Pourquoi la fiction?, 329?；蛟S我們應該承認，具有藝術性的虛構故事，并不等同于一個基于思維經驗的假想宇宙。相反，不管從修辭學角度，還是從語用學角度，虛構都不能絕對地和其他種類的話語形式所區分，而這些其他的話語形式也借助于敘述的、圖像說明的、比喻對想象力的煽動以及圖解概括之類的話語手段，正如人類學或歷史學所為。不管它如何地具有游戲特征，虛構的“好像是”（comme si）從內而外又從外而內地暗示了似真性/逼真性（la vraisemblance）：構建出的可能世界的邏輯中的似真性/逼真性（這同時也是一個想象中的世界），同時也是在被給出的文化范式的接受之中的似真性/逼真性。實際上，至少從美學角度與娛樂角度而言，正是通過似真性/逼真性，富有藝術性的虛構故事才能具有其有效性。

但是簡單地歸結為似真性/逼真性是不夠的。實際上，“富有藝術性的虛構故事總是通過一個刻意模仿的媒介來體現”，果真如此，那說明通過詞匯與圖像，那個在言語與圖像中被創造出來的潛在世界，與指涉性世界（le monde de référence）之間是存在關聯的。對于所有形式的話語的語義學能力而言，也同樣如此：通過符號學載體，在轉換指涉性圖像的時候，令人產生聯想。在這種情況下，偽裝游戲的手法并不能讓我們“脫離那些它用背后的信仰網絡所框定的表現（représentations），這些表現限制了我們的親眼所見，并構建了一個自身封閉的虛構世界”；從這一層面而言，虛構的表現并不能通過簡單的偽裝游戲，而被看作“內生的與內里的”（endogènes et endotéliques）。[19]J.-M. Schaeffer, “Quelles vérités pour quelles fi ctions?”, L’Homme 175/176 (2005): 33, 35.正是由于言語與視覺載體的使用，虛構故事強烈地指涉了那些不存在之物，并必須以表現的形式呈現，不論感知與理解的神經元過程如何（而這一過程正是語用學效果得以實現的途徑）。依靠言語或者圖像的加工，虛構故事深刻的語義學烙印充斥著指涉性，既在產生過程中又在接受過程中體現。

當我們將富有藝術性的虛構故事簡化為一種接受的約定與偽裝游戲，我們很可能重回豐特奈爾（Fontenelle）對古希臘虛構故事看法的老路：“我們的宗教和常識讓我們從希臘人的奇聞異事（fables）中清醒過來；但這些故事仍然因為詩歌與繪畫的形式而留存在我們心中，仿佛正是通過這些藝術形式，希臘人的奇聞異事找到了成為必需的秘訣。盡管與那些好心發明奇聞異事的粗俗思想的擁有者相比，我們是無與倫比的經驗豐富，但我們很容易重蹈覆轍，同樣把奇聞異事看得如此有趣；他們陶醉其中，因為他們相信那些故事，而我們雖然不相信但仍然陶醉其中；這是說明想象力可以與理性并存的最佳例證?！盵20]B. Le Bovier De Fontenelle, De l’origine des Fables (Paris: Desjonquères, 1724),109 (cité dans l’édition par A. Niderist Sous le Titre Rêveries Diverses. Opuscules Littéraires et Philosophiques［Paris: Desjonquères, 1994］, 97—111)；將他的研究與耶穌會士Joseph-Fran?ois Laf itau的歷史比較研究進行比較，請參見M. Detienne, L’invention de la mythologie (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), 19—25。因此，豐特奈爾似乎已經提出，將虛構故事簡化為一種“偽裝游戲”，即毫無理性的想象。但是，除去其原始進化論的思想，他意識到這種簡化僅僅對我們現代人是可能的，我們正面對那些奇聞異事，它們今后將被它們自身所處的信仰世界所割裂。此外，那個被我們看作詆毀神話傳說的“罪魁禍首”的豐特奈爾也重新認識到了，正是那些奇聞異事的語義學載體，無論詩歌還是繪畫，確保了傳統及其有效性，甚至確保了某種審美有效性。

3. 希臘的虛構故事與語用學

一種激進的文化與社會人類學的基礎人盡皆知，這在某種程度上便是向偽裝游戲讓步，而非接近另一種在時間和空間上都很遙遠的文化，如果我們避免用一種偏離中心的、指向我們自身現實的目光：從偏離的視角來考察我們所依賴的后現代范式，在不同之中甚至通過不同來進行考量。對于虛構故事（以及文學）的現代概念而言，偏離中心的目光將通過那些除了由溝通交流所承擔的詩歌或視覺形式來展現外，并沒有被現實性與有效性的神話取得，正是詩歌或視覺形式讓這些神話置身于其所植根的那個表現世界（l’univers représentationnel）。

3.1 神話的修辭與政治用途（呂庫爾戈斯）

深厚的傳統把希臘神話當作最典型的敘述性虛構，為其語用學意義提供了例證，我們尤其需要考察不同體裁的各自要求。具有程式的可塑性極強的詩歌語言，有著極具韻律的措辭，它在語言學意義上具有一慣性，而作品產生與接受的語境，也有與其相關的社會習慣。這兩者之間所共有的規則性，是在儀式“表演”中所體現的希臘詩歌的語用學的一個重要的載體。

公元前338年，就在馬其頓的菲利普二世戰勝希臘人的喀羅尼亞戰役打響之際，雅典公民萊奧克拉托斯（Léocrate）逃到了羅德島。當他重回雅典時，呂庫爾戈斯（Lycurgue）控告他背叛城邦。呂庫爾戈斯給雅典人列舉了一系列公民的英雄行為，以此來反襯萊奧克拉托斯的懦弱。他先講述了一個匿名的（légetai）故事，這個故事顯得有點虛構（muth?désteron），但對年輕人而言，并不妨礙他們很好地“接受”這個故事：功能性再一次勝過了外表的非似真/逼真性。當然在此人的生平中，也存在一些很可能是不真實的故事，比如在埃特納火山噴發之際，當所有人面對源源不斷的熾熱巖漿而逃跑的時候，他卻在照料身患殘疾的父親；人們被燃起的火焰所包圍，但最后只有他和他的父親完好無損并被諸神救下，因為他們美好的人性引起了有福的眾神的注意。在演說家呂庫爾戈斯的演說中，他最終使用了追根溯源的方法來確保敘事的似真/逼真性：此地（指西西里—譯按）“現在仍然”（éti kaì n?n）屬于那些虔信之人。通過地名，敘事的真實在某種程度上被植根于西西里的地貌之中并被其所證明。[21]Lycurgue, Contre Léocrate 95—97.

但是，為了能更好地追憶“palaiá”（往昔的時光），這一對我們而言對應于“神話”的英雄過往，必須要從西西里回到雅典。呂庫爾戈斯仍舊用了一個匿名的敘事，該敘事講述了（phasi）波塞冬之子色雷斯國王歐墨爾普斯（Eumolpe）對阿提卡的入侵。面對危險，雅典國王厄瑞克特烏斯（érechthée）求得德爾菲神諭，神諭囑咐他獻祭自己的女兒以獲得對歐墨爾普斯的勝利。這一起源性敘事之所以為我們所熟知，主要是因為歐里庇得斯所寫的悲劇，而呂庫爾戈斯在他的演說中也大段引用了歐里庇得斯的作品。厄瑞克特烏斯的妻子（即普拉柯西苔婭—譯按）被懇請同意祭獻自己的女兒，輪到她發言來表明自己的態度：通過對她的言說的引用，演說家賦予其觀點一個詩化的表達方式。由此，通過悲劇的話語，呂庫爾戈斯追述了傳奇而又詩意的人物普拉柯西苔婭（Praxithéa），她正是偉大的靈魂與高貴公民之榜樣。為了城邦，她準備好了要祭獻自己的“家庭與居所”（o?kos）。她同時采用了女性視角與男性視角，以此激發公民，讓他們能夠去保家衛國。在缺少男性子嗣的情況下，以雅典人所自夸的本土血統（autochtone，土著的，亦指大地的，引申為由“大地所生”—譯注）之名，王后同意祭獻自己的女兒。在悲劇的敘事中，她將是唯一幸存下來的。那位祭壇上死去的女孩的兩位姐妹，為了和她患難與共，也一同犧牲，而在戰爭取得勝利并結束后，由于歐墨爾普斯之子被殺，波塞冬為了報仇，用三叉戟擊中厄瑞克特烏斯：這位阿提卡國王便如此身赴黃泉，重歸塵土，回到大地的深處，那個他出生的地方，正如其祖父埃里克托尼奧斯（érichthonios）那樣，后者是因為赫淮斯托斯與貞潔的雅典娜交合不成，精液濺到了肥沃的土地上而生。

從活人獻祭到字面意義上的 “土生土長”（naissance autochtone），經歷了把出于某位神的意志而赴死之人埋葬在大地深處的過程，演說家口中的這一起源性敘事并沒有因此而泄露其非似/逼真性（invraisemblances）。在阿提卡的舞臺上所上演的“神話傳說”，在與當下的雙重關系中找到了自己的歷史真實與語用學效果：它的主角是雅典人的祖先，他們的父輩正是在這樣一種傳統中長大的，我們要歸功于一位詩人，他的例子說明了對祖國的愛要優于對自己孩子的愛。演說家的結論是不可動搖的：“如果女人也能做出這樣的行為，那么男人必須忠于他們的祖國，永遠不放棄家園而叛逃，也不能像萊奧克拉托斯那樣在所有希臘人面前做出有損祖國名譽的事情?！盵22]Lycurgue, Contre Léocrate 98—101，這里引用了：Euripide, érechthée fr. 360 Kannicht (= 14 Jouan-Van Looy)；這一雙重角色被Praxithéa所接受，她既是母親，又是公民，Sebillotte-Cuchet對此有著很好的論述，參見V. Sebillotte Cuchet, “La Place de la Maternité dans la Rhétorique Patriotique de l’Athènes classique (Ve—IVeSiècles Avant Notre ère): Autour de Praxithéa”, éd. L. Fournier-Finocchiaro, Les Mères de la Patrie: Représentations et Constructions d’une Figure Nationale Cahiers de la MRSH 45 (2006): 237—250；同時參見G. Sissa & M. Detienne, La vie quotidienne des dieux grecs (Paris: Hachette, 1989), 238—245。

3.2 神話的虛構性及其儀式有效性（歐里庇得斯）

然而在公元前5世紀末，歐里庇得斯的某出悲劇在狄奧尼索斯劇院的舞臺上所上演的“神話故事”（m?thos）與雅典的觀眾們所踐行的文化實踐之間建立了一種很強的聯系。實際上，這出悲劇的情節以挽歌的詩句告終，它哀嘆厄瑞克特烏斯一家以及城邦的命運，他們遭受了著魔般的波塞冬那毀滅性的瘋狂之苦。之后雅典娜親自出面干預；在“解圍之神”（dea ex machina）的光輝之中，伴隨著城邦的守護女神那具有權威的聲音。從歐里庇得斯悲劇往往以之為劇終的起源性視角，女神將戲劇中的所有雅典主角變作享有儀式榮譽的受益者。[23]歐里庇得斯悲劇的起源學結尾，遠非詩人自己的發明，通常與仍舊存在的崇拜儀式有關。關于這一飽受爭議的問題，尤見：Ch. Sourvinou-Inwood, Tragedy and Athenian Religion (Lanham —Boulder — New York — Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002), 414—422。首先是雅典國王夫婦的三位女兒，在她們那不能靠近的墓地—圣殿周圍，她們將定期受到由年輕女孩所組成的合唱團舞者的音樂供奉，并享受每次城邦作戰前的祭獻供奉；接著，她們的父親厄瑞克特烏斯將在衛城上的神殿里享用牛牲，這一犧牲同時也獻給波塞冬，他與這位神和解了，并被指定為城邦的次要守護神；最后，普拉柯西苔婭成為雅典娜的首位女祭司，后者會在衛城的祭壇上接受雅典的善男信女們的獻祭。[24]Euripide, érechthée fr. 370, 55—100 Kannicht (= fr. 22, 55—100 Jouan-Van Looy)；對波塞冬—厄瑞克特烏斯這個形象的界定以及兩者不同的功能，參見S. Darthou, “Retour à la terre: la f in de la Geste d’érecthée”, Kernos 18 (2005): 69—83。

通過雅典娜在舞臺上的顯現這一干預，針對傳說中的國王厄瑞克特烏斯及其女兒們那富有傳奇色彩而又充滿悲劇性的死亡所做的戲劇化敘事，不僅導向了儀式行為的制定，以此來榮耀城邦的保護神，更導向了儀式實踐的展示，這種儀式實踐正是當時還在衛城邊的狄奧尼索斯劇院—神廟所上演的：觀眾聚集在那里展示了這種儀式實踐。語用學層面上，雅典的舞臺上所表演的起源性神話故事與“此時此地”（hic et nunc）在文化與社會關聯中所體現的戲劇性表現之間的關系，被賦予了一層更重要的關聯，表演的行為為所有悲劇作品所構建的儀式性的音樂表演的歷史由來提供了一種雙重關聯：一方面，借助色雷斯國王歐墨爾普斯的軍隊對“神話/虛構故事（mythe）”的追憶，讓人們想到了斯巴達軍隊的入侵，以及在公元前422年悲劇上演之時的伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的第一階段；另一方面，這種儀式化的戲劇處理，很可能與“厄瑞克特翁神廟”（érechthéion）的建造相吻合，這座神廟被用來取代在薩拉米戰役之前波斯人燒毀的老雅典娜神廟；需要重申的是，這座混合式建筑的神廟，是注定要匯集所有阿提卡與雅典的最初起源歷史相關的珍貴紀念品，從衛城的巖石上那被波塞冬的三叉戟所激起的愛琴海水—海神三叉戟所留下的痕跡，到雅典娜的橄欖樹—在薛西斯的軍隊燒毀衛城后立刻重生。這座建筑矗立在城邦空間之中，與其定期舉行的儀式一起，關聯起展現阿提卡經濟繁榮與土壤肥沃的敘事，在獻給狄奧尼索斯的音樂與文化方面的重大競技活動召開之際，它們相得益彰。通過歐里庇得斯所重塑的悲劇形式的強烈審美旨趣，不真實的敘事找到了它自身宗教與社會意義上的有效性，它成了創制者；若非是在團體的音樂表演中，它就無法具有這種指涉性與語用學意義上的真實。

就如同歐里庇得斯的悲劇所設想的那樣，這位雅典女性具有公民精神，同時出于女性的本能不背棄自己的母性與對孩子的愛，但這樣一個例子，顯然不能完全讓演說家呂庫爾戈斯的聽眾信服。需要繼續往前追溯歷史。就像在歌唱詩詩人（les poètes méliques）那里，必須要參考泛希臘傳統，那是荷馬史詩所表現的傳統，它敘述了男性戰士的偉大功績，正是在那片土地上，人們講述著特洛亞戰爭那個虛構故事。在這特殊的情況下，對無條件愛國進行補充并具有說服力的例子，出自赫克托爾勉勵特洛亞人保家衛國的那個情節：戰死沙場，為榮耀而死，并不僅僅是為了拯救父輩的土地，更是為了它的女人、孩子和家園。呂庫爾戈斯并沒有選擇赫克托爾之死這個例子，而是選擇了這位英雄對他的戰士們所作的戰前致辭，這樣一來，他便能將他的修辭觀念等同于這位特洛亞的英雄。通過這一策略，他不僅讓他的演說內容變得有效，還在表演中讓他自己的致辭本身變得有效。很有可能這便是他之所以追憶祖先的律法的原因，因為每隔四年，那些荷馬以及其他詩人的史詩都會在游吟詩人比賽中吟誦，作為泛雅典娜節的慶祝，以此來向保護女神雅典娜表達敬意。如果希臘人最動人的英雄舉動并沒有在儀式性的“展示”（epídeixis）中體現出來，那么這些舉動便毫無意義。[25]Lycurgue, Contre Léocrate 102—104，這段引用了：Homère, Iliade 15, 494—499?！昂神R”作為對古代雅典的戰士美德描述的模板，參見：Aristophane, Grenouilles 1036，作為古典修辭術的模板，參見：Isocrate, Panégyrique 159。在Latacz最近出版的論著中，他十分嚴謹地討論了有關特洛亞戰爭真實性的最具爭議的問題：J. Latacz, Troy and Homer Towards a Solution of an Old Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)。正是在這樣一個慶祝雅典娜女神的重大的宗教與城邦慶典上，荷馬的虛構故事獲得了其有效性。正是通過荷馬詩句之美及其在儀式上的引用，特洛亞戰爭的那些英雄們的動人舉動變得有效，就在“此時此地”（hic et nunc）。

3.3 詩歌中的禮儀語用學（忒奧克里托斯）

但當希臘詩歌那偉大傳統的中心轉移到了亞歷山大里亞時，在那里，這些詩歌為一種君主制度服務，而這種制度又受到了馬其頓君主制度與法老等級制度的雙重影響，此時又發生了什么呢？當實用性的詩歌形式變成了文本，并成為新建立的圖書館中那些需要研究的本文的時候，在那些如同詩歌加工般的虛構故事以及英雄敘述身上，又發生了什么呢？當那些知識淵博的學者們稱呼自己為“詩人兼批評家”（poietaì háma kaì kritikoí）的時候，在現代意義下的文學領域里，詩的虛構的創作又發生了什么呢？

在歸為田園詩歌的奠基者—忒奧克里托斯的作品里，有一篇《海倫的婚禮頌詩》（épithalame d’Hélène），其中詩人為一種面向書面文學的文化指明了實用而儀式性的詩歌的發展方向。這部作品按體裁分類，被稱為是一首“牧歌”（idylle），但這種分類僅僅反映了一個“無關緊要的形式”（詩歌的）；雖然這部作品和史詩一樣也用了六音步長短短格，但卻以婚禮贊歌（hyménée）的形式出現：這個在希臘舉行的婚禮慶典的過渡儀式上，有三個重要場景，由一群年輕女孩所組成的合唱隊載歌載舞，來表現婚禮之歌—首先是在新娘的父親家中所舉行的宴會上，其次是在把新娘帶到她未來丈夫的家中的儀式隊列里，最后則是新婚之夜在這對年輕夫婦家中。薩福（Sappho）創作過一部名為婚禮頌詩（épithalames）的詩歌集，在傳統意義上，她所創作的婚禮贊歌（hyménée），先贊美新郎，然后再贊美新娘，并用表述行為的方式，竭力完成為年輕姑娘所準備的婚禮過渡儀式。因此，在最符合傳統的形式里，忒奧克里托斯的《海倫的婚禮頌詩》首先要說出的便是詩的贊美：先用那些對熟睡中的年輕新郎梅內勞斯所提出的問題來引出，再用來自符合“祝?！保╩acarismos）形式的贊美來引出：“幸運的新郎??！”他娶了一位神的女兒，并將要親自成為宙斯的女婿。[26]Théocrite, Idylle 18，同時參閱R. Hunter, Theocritus and the Archaeology of Greek Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 149—161的評注。

從表述的觀點來看，同時參照本維尼斯特（émile Benveniste）有關“表述的形式裝置”（appareil formel de l’énonciation）的操作分類，有兩個步驟需要指出：一方面，整個文本都保持了第二人稱“你”的稱呼，這恢復了“話語”的地位，對梅內勞斯的提及把我們引入了希臘的傳奇歷史以及由此引出的神話所構建的“古事”（arkha?a）之中；從時空角度而言，過去的時間與在斯巴達的那個行為發生地，共同塑造了“歷史/敘事”（histoire/récit）。[27]有關“歷史/敘事”與“話語”之間的分別，以及多種多樣的用途（我們也可以在古希臘詩學的語用學研究中對此進行研究），筆者已多次論述，尤請參見Calame 2005: 14—40。另一方面，根據婚禮贊歌這一文學形式的傳統，宙斯之名讓故事一下子聚焦到了新娘的身上。因此，海倫持續被提到，并從那些正在歌唱婚禮贊歌的年輕女孩中脫穎而出：“我們這里所有的女孩，在歐羅塔斯（Eurotas）河邊奔跑，如同男子一般涂上圣油，有六十的四倍那么多人，是女子的童子軍；我們誰都不能和海倫的無懈可擊相比?！保ǖ?2—25行）就在“敘事”與“話語”相融合并達到新境界的同時，神話敘述與對儀式的描述合為一體。

由此，婚禮頌詩便能直接歌唱海倫了，并用呼格“美麗而動人的姑娘”（第38行），而她也就這樣變成了家庭主母（ma?tresse de maison）。從亞歷山大里亞的詩人們所青睞的起源解釋觀點出發，這一頌歌從最近的過去過渡到不久的將來，對于這種起源解釋的觀點，我們打算在另一項研究里探討。[28]有關希臘神話運用于起源解釋的諸多例子，參見Ch. Delattre, Manuel de Mythologie Grecque (Paris: Bréal, 2005), 185—222。實際上，美麗的海倫從少女到少婦的這一神話里的轉變，使得詩人有機會來描述一個儀式，這個儀式是合唱隊的年輕姑娘們為了流傳美麗而神圣的少女—作為“處女”（parthénos）—的記憶正在創設的：用一頂王冠和奠酒儀式來供奉，供奉的場所是在一棵布滿樹蔭的梧桐樹旁，從今往后這棵樹將被稱作“海倫之樹”（第57行）。

整首詩歌以婚禮贊歌結束，在對年輕新娘及新郎的祝愿中畫上了句號。養兒育女的勒托（Lét? courotrophe）將會祝福他們子孫滿堂，阿佛羅狄忒祝福他們夫妻恩愛，而宙斯則祝福他們永福永貴。在第一人稱復數“我們”的許諾之后，詩人回到傳統的蘇醒之歌，接著，詩人以疊句來結束，強調了婚禮贊歌的儀式程式：“司掌婚姻的女神?。℉ymen ? Hyménée）”，用口頭“證明”（deixis）的方式，召喚一位英雄，邀請他來見證婚禮，這種口頭證明，成為歌唱詩的標志，在其儀式性過程中出現，即在歌唱中。[29]關于構成了希臘儀式詩歌的多種形式的指示系統（deixis）的語用學，參見筆者的研究：Calame 2005b。是否可以這樣認為，在神話傳說的虛構故事中，講述本身與海倫和梅內勞斯那婚姻典范的英雄式場景一起，在詩歌歌唱的“此時此地”（hic et nunc），通向了婚姻儀式的慶典？如果答案是肯定的，那么我們便忽略了在忒奧克里托斯詩歌開頭所寫的那幾行。詩歌借金發的梅內勞斯之口，通過“曾幾何時”這樣的表述，將場景定在了斯巴達，并用歌唱著的年輕女孩，來與她們所組成的合唱隊之間產生時間上與敘述上的距離，這個合唱隊由十二位優秀的斯巴達女孩組成，她們齊心協力歌唱著，并用一種巧妙的交叉節奏拍打地面，讓婚姻贊歌的歌聲久久回蕩。在這樣一個敘述性的開篇場景里（柏拉圖對話錄那里也是如此），第一人稱“我們”確保了“敘事”所要體現的“她們”；此后，“敘事”模式將闡明贊歌的具體表述情境，以此來置身于敘述的場景當中，那便是宙斯之女海倫與她幸福的丈夫梅內勞斯，以及特洛亞戰爭的英雄們。那么，這能否說明詩歌將我們帶入了一個純虛構的世界中呢（用現代術語來講，一種偽裝游戲的純虛構）？

一方面，如果比較一下忒奧克里托斯的其他頌詩，以及標志著詩歌首句的指示性連接詞“ára”，我們可以看到宮廷詩歌表述的具體情況，這種詩歌伴隨著亞歷山大里亞圖書館的建立及其獻給繆斯的神廟的設立而不斷發展。我們不難想到，對身處斯巴達英雄時代的海倫與梅內勞斯這對模范夫婦在新婚之夜的贊揚，影射了公元前3世紀統治亞歷山大里亞的那對國王夫婦：托勒密一世（Ptolémée I S?ter） 和他的第三任妻子白瑞尼絲（Bérénice），這位妻子后來被神化并被納入阿佛羅狄忒的崇拜儀式當中。[30]對于這一觀點，參見R. Hunter, Theocritus and the Archaeology of Greek Poetry, 163—166所給出的多種推論，以及筆者待刊的論文。關于忒奧克里托斯的田園詩歌中被構建并戲劇化的虛構世界，參見M. Payne, Theocritus and the Invention of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 49—91。另一方面，第二次智術師運動中所盛行的小說這一體裁告訴我們，對于越來越多依靠寫作傳統的敘述形式而言，“偽裝游戲”并非明智之舉；這些依靠寫作的敘述形式如此之多，在虛構敘事中，它們涉及了構建整個傳統希臘文化的詩歌人類學（anthropopoiétique）維度的各種要素：空間、價值以及實踐。當然，在希臘的那些小說里，就像在忒奧克里托斯的詩歌里一樣，表述的策略與寫作的策略是豐富而巧妙的，這種策略能夠讓那個敘述沉浸在自己的世界之中。同樣，比如《達芙妮斯與克羅?！罚―aphnis et Chloé）這部小說，在開場白的時候便加入了第一人稱的敘述：“我”。在萊斯波斯島（Lesbos）上的一次狩獵活動中，就在那將要上演浪漫愛情故事的空間里，敘述者發現自己正面對一幅獻給寧芙神女（Nymphes）的畫作。通過“圖像化再現”（ekphrasis）的方式，親子之愛與情欲之愛的場景被表現了出來，預示著敘事者受此啟發而要講述的故事情節。這一表述性的場景，清楚地解釋了虛構敘述的語用學，年輕的牧羊人達芙妮斯和清純而天真的克羅埃的故事由此上演：“我創作了四卷書，獻給厄洛斯（éros）、寧芙神女（Nymphes）以及潘神（Pan），對所有男子而言，擁有這部書既賞心又悅目：它將會治愈疾病、慰藉憂傷、喚醒愛情并教導那些尚未沐浴愛河的人們?！盵31]Longus, Daphnis et Chloé, Proème；參見Cassin, L’Effet Sophistique, 507—512，以及A. Bierl,“Der Griechische Roman — ein Mythos? Gedanken zur Mythischen Dimension von Longos’ Daphnis und Chloe”, eds. U. Dill & Ch. Walde, Antike Mythen. Medien, Transformationen und Konstruktionen (Berlin — New York: de Gruyter, 2009), 718—733（關于“神話傳說”在這部小說里起到的作用）。

4. 虛構故事：與后現代的本文主義保持距離

我們可以再次回到塞克斯都·恩披里可那里，這位希臘哲學家并不滿足于粉碎歷史與神話之間那種現代意義上的對立，他在“似—真”（vrai-semblable）的層面上引入了敘述加工的“好似”（comme si）概念；但是這位懷疑論哲學家最后卻把“神話”（m?thos）加入了“捏造”（plásma）之中，由此將兩者都作為歷史的補充。但實際上，在“神話”（m?thos）和“捏造”（plásma）的時空框架中，歷史不僅包括著名人物的行為，也同樣包括英雄的偉業以及眾神的介入；比如，阿斯克萊比奧斯（Asclépios—古希臘醫師之祖），他讓從忒拜城墻上跌下的英雄們起死回生，救治了受赫拉之懲罰而發瘋的普羅伊托斯（Proitos）的女兒們，或者醫治了從特類增（Trézène） 出逃的希波呂特斯（Hippolyte）；塞克斯都·恩披里可給出了他的史料：比如像斯忒西克魯斯（Stésichore）這樣的詩人，或者像庫勒涅的波呂安托斯（Polyanthos de Cyrène）和瑙克拉提斯的斯塔福洛斯（Staphylos de Naucratis）這樣的地方史家。因此，從荷馬史詩當中清除出去的只是那些英雄變為動物的荒誕故事，比如赫庫蓓（Hécube）變成了狗，奧德修斯變成了馬。[32]Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 260—262 及264—265，分別引用了Stésichore fr. 194 (IV) Page-Davies, Polyanthos FGrHist. 37 F 1，以及Staphylos de Naucratis FGrHist. 269 F 3。從此以后，既沒有詩歌，也沒有散文會關涉儀式化的表演；被采納的敘述方式再也不包含那些表述的策略，正是這些策略塑造了那些講述英雄敘事的詩歌，是那些英雄敘事更清楚地表明了頌詩的行為，和由此而來的崇拜行為。相反，語用學關聯則一直根深蒂固，并構建了我們通過似真性/逼真性所感知為神話的虛構故事的東西，這種似真性/逼真性，在一種文化范疇中找尋到了自己的基礎，這種文化范疇由一種非常豐富的英雄傳統所支撐，并被富有生命力的多神教形象化。希臘神話那出色的可塑性，見證了口述的虛構故事與不斷變化的多樣化文化語境之間那始終如一的契合。[33]對于希臘神話的持續不斷地再創作，參見筆者所編論著C. Calame (éd.), Métamorphoses du Mythe dans la Grèce Antique (Genève: Labor & Fides, 1988)，以及一本非常實用的著作：R. Buxton, Imaginary Greece. The Contexts of Mythology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 9—66 (trad. fr. par M. Wechsler-Bruderlein: La Grèce de l’imaginaire: les Contextes de la Mythologie ［Paris: La Découverte, 1996］)。在那里，沒有什么出于純粹的想象。

作為結論，我們再次文不對題，批判性地簡單討論一下當下所存在的問題。試問，那些對科技的有效性深信不疑的電子游戲玩家們，相信他們所見到并由此而被操縱的真實嗎？他們不正如此這般地對這些游戲著迷而又一往情深嗎？這另一種文化的人類學視角能夠把我們帶回那批判而又偏離中心的情境中，在這樣一種回歸之中，從一種純語用學的角度來講，依賴于“偽裝游戲”這樣的解釋，并不能令人滿意。在后現代主義的時代，仍然強烈地受到新自由主義具有競爭性和個人主義色彩的意識形態影響，這種意識形態引出了相對主義的文本主義，是時候拋棄它了。虛構故事所帶來的審美作用及感情作用，既要在敘述的虛構所構建的世界中，又要在以言語或視覺的方式加工而成的世界中去尋找。一方面，這個世界是可能的，也是想象的，被一種文化范式所引導，以此來被某一使用群體接受；另一方面，這個世界所接受的文學創作（po(i)étique）形式，既確保了句法上與語義學上的一致性，又確保了一種語用學作用。為了有效，虛構故事只可能是指涉性的！在隱藏于富有藝術性的創作之下的詩學與文學批評的研究方式之間經常的互動中，當代人對于虛構故事具有自身指涉性（l’autoréférentialité）的斷言，實質上不過是后現代文本主義的一個結果。

如果這些不同形式的希臘詩歌既非虛構，亦非文學，那么這些詩歌所教會我們的，便是從語用學意義上—指涉性并且是文化性的語用學意義上—去思考話語的創制（“poie?n”）所要表現的內容。

（周之桓 譯，張巍 校）

部分重要概念譯名對照表：

comme si 好似

le vraisemble 似真/逼真

la vraisemblance 似真性/逼真性

le ?vrai-semblable? “似—真”

la ?vrai-semblablance? “似—真性”

invraisemblances 非似真/逼真性

m?thos 可以指話語、神話、傳說、虛構故事、情節，等等。

—譯按

Notes on Author:Claude Calame is Director of studies emeritus at the école des Hautes études en Sciences Sociales in Paris (Centre AnHiMA: Anthropologie et Histoire des Mondes Antiques); he was Professor of Greek language and literature at the University of Lausanne. He taught also at the Universities of Urbino and Siena in Italy, and at Yale University in the US. In English he publishedThe Craft of Poetic Speech in Ancient Greece(Cornell University Press 1995),The Poetics of Eros in Ancient Greece(Princeton University Press 1999),Choruses of Young Women in Ancient Greece(Rowman & Littlef ield, 2001, 2nded.),Masks of Authority. Fiction and Pragmatics in Ancient Greek Poetics(Cornell University Press 2005),Poetic and Performative Memory in Ancient Greece(CHS — Harvard University Press 2009),Greek Mythology. Poetics, Pragmatics and Fiction(Cambridge University Press 2009).

[34] A f irst French version of this paper has been published in F. Lavocat & A. Duprat (edd.), Fiction et cultures (Paris: SFLGC, 2010), 33—56.

In the movement of the second sophistic, at the close of Antonine rule, the sceptic philosopher Sextus Empiricus offers a seemingly modern def inition of myth. As a presentation (ékthesis) of completed (gegónota) and therefore real actions, history (hístoría) is seemingly opposed to myth (m?thos), which refers to events that have not occurred (agéneta) and are therefore “mendacious”, If truth be told, the apparent structural opposition between history and myth, and by extensionbetween factual and f ictitious accounts, is immediately complemented by a third term:plásma; that is, f iction in its etymological sense: from the Latinf ingere, “to make/fashion”, which corresponds exactly in its literal sense to the Greekpláttein,“to mould/shape”. By way of mimesis, “f iction” stands between “history” and“myth” in that it refers not to an account of events that have not taken place, but to an account of events that resemble those that have taken place. Originating from the“as if” of f iction/fashion, the plausible would thus be associated with the truth (of history) and sharply separated from myth, which is false.[35]Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 263—264; for latin parallels, cf. B. Cassin, L’Effet sophistique (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 481—484, on the distinction between fabula (tragedies and poems), argumentum (false, but similar to the truth), and historia as it occurs in narration, especially in Quintilian, Instituto Oratoria 1, 8, 18—21. The impact of the “as if” of schematization and of representational and discursive fabrication on the very establishment of our knowledge in the domain of human sciences has been shown most notably by S. Borutti, “Fiction et construction de l’objet en anthropologie”, in F. Affergan, S. Boruti, C. Calame, U. Fabietti, M. Kilani, F. Remotti, Figures de l’humain. Les représentations de l’anthropologie (Paris: éditions de l’Ehess, 2003), 88—99.

1. Fiction as Representational Po(i)etics

Yet, despite the new placement of its constituents betweenplásmaandm?thos, the notion of narrative fabrication is fundamentally equivalent to the Aristotelian concept of the art of poetry. Thetékhne poietikéis styled asmímesis, as the art of representing dramatic actions in verse, be it in tragedy or epic poetry. Here, in contrast to Plato’s forms, which in his own conceptual interpretation ofmimesisthe philosopher decries as facsimiles, tragedy and comedy are based on am?thos; that which is perceived in the classical period as “effective discourse” is understood in thePoetics asa “conf iguration of actions” (súnthesisorsústasis t?n pragmáton), or “intrigue”, “plot”.[36]Aristotle, Poetics 6, 1449b 24—27 (“tragedy is the representation of an action that is noble and completed by means of language enriched ...”) and 23, 1459a 17—21 (“narrative art”, mimetic art in meter, consists in “creating dramatic intrigues like in tragedy”); on the specif ic meaning of m?thos in the Poetics, see 6, 1450a 22—23 and 29—34; cf. P. Ric?ur, Temps et récit. Tome I (Paris: éditions du Seuil, 1983), 55—84, who analyzes in detail the interweaving of m?thos with mimesis as poetic conf iguration, as well as J.-M. Schaeffer, Pourquoi la f iction? (Paris: éditions du Seuil, 1999), 42—60, on narrative feint in Plato.Narrative f iction/fabrication is thus conceived of as verbal representation.

1.1 Between Poetry and History

Still, this Aristotelian conception of the art of poetry is purely narrative, for itexplicitly excludes not only all the aspects of Greek poetics that relate to musical performance, but also themélos, which encompasses all forms of poetry associated with ritual practice.[37]Cf. F. Dupont, Aristote ou le vampire du théatre occidental (Paris: Aubier, 2007), 39—77.In this model however, history still has its place, albeit antithetically! We are all familiar with the juxtaposed words of that sentence by Aristotle, so many times asserted and commented upon: “The poet’s task is not to relate what has happened (tà ginómena), but that which could happen either likely or inevitably (katà tò eikòs è tò anagka?on). Indeed, the historian and the poet differ (...) in that one tells what has happened, the other that which might happen. For this reason poetry is a more philosophical and noble pursuit than history. Poetry speaks more of the general, and history the particular”.[38]Aristotle, Poetics 9, 1451a 36—b 11 and 1451b27—32, which can be read in combination with my commentary, C. Calame, Pratiques poétiques de la mémoire. Représentations de l’espace-temps en Grèce ancienne (Paris: La Découverte, 2006), 61—64; see also B. Boulay, “Histoire et narrativité. Autour des chapitres 9 et 23 de la Poétique d’Aristote”, Lallies 26 (2006): 171—179; on the relationships between pláttein and mímesis, cf. A. Ford, The Origins of Criticism. Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical Greece (Princeton — Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 229—233.Have we thus returned to that reassuring binary opposition? Factual accounts on one side, f ictitious ones on the other? From this perspective then, history would convey the facts, characterized as it is by the particular, whereas poetry, because it stands on mythic foundations, would f ind itself placed alongside f iction.

In reality, the distinguishing criterion is more subtle, and is not based on the account’s measure of truth. Fact does not stand in opposition to falsehood. Rather, it is contrasted with that which is likely (verisimilar) or inevitable, along with everything that the art of mimetic fabrication entails. And yet, as I have argued elsewhere, the now canonical distinction between (dramatic) poetry and history that Aristotle contributes to the subject, is never mentioned. While the traditional distinction between rhythmic composition and prose might not differentiate the poet from the historian, the former can nevertheless describe events that have happened (genómena) and are the latter’s purview. If it is true that the poet’s art is mimetic, if his role is in fact to produce (poie?n) actions, nothing prevents him from including within his narrative any happenings (genómena) that are of a verisimilar (or likely) or possible nature. If the retold events comply with the two criteria of the mimetic art of narration, then the poet and historian’s relative spheres can intersect. As such, it is the very process of poetic composition and creation that would render the distinction we try to draw between factual and f ictitious accounts blurred and permeable inthe eyes of the Greek poeticians of the Classical period. From the Classical Greek perspective, it is the role of the verisimilar or likely and of the possible, if not the necessary, to transform fallacy into truth by means of poetic fabrication; a truth that is not necessarily of an empirical and factual nature; rather, it is a truth that attends every “mythical” narrative, from Homer’s epics to Athenian tragedy, where heroic epic achieves its f inal form.

1.2 From the Plausible to the Politically Useful

It is f iction as craft that is the agent of poetic and mimetic transformation. In Aristotle’s restrictive narrative perspective, it is the representationalpoie?nthat takes the shape of the conf iguration and organization of events (súnthesisandsústasis t?n pragmáton), of them?thosas narrative intrigue. Yet, although this understanding of narrative logic does not appear to imply theplátteinof the narrative process, the noun extracted from the verb is already used by the elegiac poet Xenophanes. Critic of Colophon, sage regarded as “pre-Socratic”, the poet anticipates Plato by a good century and not only in regard to poetry; indeed, he denounces the theologian poets Homer and Hesiod for attributing reprehensible acts to the gods. Yet he also condemns the telling in symposia of epic tales featuring Titans, Giants, and Centaurs. What allows the wise poet to condemn the “fabrications of our progenitors” (plásmata t?n protéron) is not the monstrous, and therefore unreal character of these pre-Olympian beings, but rather the fact that these accounts contain “nothing of use”.[39]Xenophanes frr. 15 and 13—24 Gentili-Prato; on the aff inities between narrative modeling and the poetic poein, cf. C. Calame, Mythe et histoire dans l’antiquité grecque. La création symbolique d’une colonie (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012), 47—49 as well as C. Calame, Poétique des mythes dans la Grèce antique (Paris: Hachette, 2000), 38—42.At a banquet then, divinity and joyful men (heroes implied) should be sung of in wholesome tales (lógoi) and praise speeches (m?thoi) that will thus uphold their good name. While the termm?thosis here used in its conventional sense as argued (and sometimes narrative) discourse with a strong pragmatic dimension, the use of the verbhumne?nrefers to the poetic and sung quality of laudatory tales that are a requisite of ritual banquets[40]Bibliographic references available in C. Calame, Mythe et histoire dans l’antiquité grecque. La création symbolique d’une colonie, 48 n. 44—45.. As we will see, it is through poetic means that the “f ictional” account acquires its pragmatic strength, in a function that is both political and social.

Yet, when choosing a narrative meant to illustrate an argument, verisimilitudetogether with usefulness as a criterion has also had a determining role in philosophy and all forms of rhetoric up until the second Sophistic. The teaching of rhetoric relied on it for preparative exercises, and it is theseProgymnasmatathat Aelius Theon presents in his manual. Reserving the termm?thosas a designation for a fable of the animal type, the Alexandrian rhetor simply identif ies traditional stories featuring gods and heroic f igures astales(diégema). In order for the fable to be suitable for rhetorical discussion, it must be the object of the young orator’s creation (plásai); he will draw from stories collected in the written accounts of the ancients, or from those transmitted through oral tradition. Even if they are sometimes false or impossible, they may still prove convincing and therefore useful (pithanà kaì ophélima). The same is true of stories that aremuthikaì diegéseisand seem to us to be “myths”. If they appear to be false and impossible, they are nonetheless subject to criticism as regards the protagonist of the narrated event, the event itself, its location, its time period, its outcome and its cause. If the account of Medea sacrif icing her children is not convincing it is because of its implausibility and unlikely character (ouk eikós) in regard to the different parameters indicated above. According to the rhetor, thus does Herodotus proceed, as indeed he does when he interprets the Egyptian doves that the mythic story presents as the origin of the oracle of Dodona as young Theban women; so too Plato, who at the beginning of thePhaedrusconnects the f igure of Boreas pursuing Oreithyia to the north wind that pushed the young girl over the cliff as she was playing with her friend.[41]Aelius Theon, Progymnasmata 75, 9—76, 16 and 93, 5—96, 10, by reference in particular to Herodotus 2, 52—57 and Plato, Phaedra 229c (a muthológema conceived as alethés!).

The procedure for restoring the pragmatic dimension of the protagonists and events of heroic legends through verisimilitude is ultimately offered by the historian Ephorus as early as the fourth century BCE. For example, the historiographer associates Python, the serpent said to guard the original site of Delphi, with the brutal animalistic nature of the individual, and the giant Tityos with the unjust violence of a primitive sovereign.[42]Ephorus, FgrHist. 70 F 31 and 34 cited by Aelius Theon, Progymnasmata 95, 23—96,4.Several centuries later, Plutarch makes it very clear at the beginning of his biography of the legendary Theseus, founding hero of Athenian democracy: when approaching the distant worlds of the heroic past, worlds that are known to us only through the writings of tragedians and mythographers, it is necessary to “purify that which is f ictional (tò muth?des) by subjecting it toa discourse that is rational (lógos) and by conferring upon it the characteristics of historical inquiry (historía)”. The author of theParallel Livesleaves no ambiguity in the approach he profers: one must travel through time performing an inquiry that will approach past events through the medium of likely discourse (eikòs lógos); verisimilitude for the narrative, and political usefulness, in the larger and Greek sense of the word, for the propounded heroic model.

1.3 Myth and Truth Value

In Aelius Theon’s manual, among all the legends presented to the student of rhetoric as materials to be discussed in discourse prior to their use as examples, the measure of truth of the account itself is never doubted. The historical reality of cruel beings such as Medea, Python, or Tityos is never questioned, despite their monstrous traits and actions. In fact the same was already true for Thucydides, who in modern eyes is nevertheless perceived as the founder ofl’histoire événementielle, or at the very least of positive history. Minos, Pelops, Agamemnon, and Helen are the very f irst protagonists in the Hellenization of Greece and the maritime expeditions that sought to extend Greek power over the Aegean Sea and its oriental coast. Admittedly, we owe our knowledge of these foundational events to an epic tradition, to an oral tradition that often bears the name of Homer. Yet it is a tradition that provides cues for identif ication and proof (tekméria), as do the signs (seme?a) that are written into the landscape of cities now in ruins. The role of the (unaware) historian is to then submit them to an examination (skope?n) that allows him to add conf idence to his discourse.

This historical space is not characterized as a realm of myth, nor even as that of heroic legend. Rather, it belongs to the sphere of thearcha?onor of thetò pálai, the “distant past”, the “times of old”. For that matter, an ancient commentator of Thucydides did not miss the opportunity to label the prelude that leads us from the incipient origins of Hellas to the eve of the Persian wars as the “archaeology”. Transmitted through the poet’s songs or through the discourse of logographers (such as Herodotus) who intend their work for a public audience, subjected to the critical eye of an author composing asúggrama(a simple treatise), stripped of any“f ictional” (muth?des) content, thesepalaiáandarcha?aare associated with an historical and factual reality; but this historical reality is refashioned according to the principle of verisimilitude. We all know the conclusion: “Perhaps when rehearsed, in the absence of f iction (muth?des), the events (tà genómena) will be less pleasing (...), but it will suff ice that they be useful; they are rather compiled as a possessionfor all time than to be recited before an ephemeral audience.”[43]See in particular Thucydides 1, 1, 2; 3, 3; 9, 3—10, 3; 20, 1; 21, 1—2 and lastly, the famous passage in 22, 4, in conjunction with a few of my comments on the subject, presented in C. Calame, Pratiques poétiques de la mémoire. Représentations de l’espace-temps en Grèce ancienne, 46—57 and in C. Calame, Mythe et histoire dans l’antiquité grecque. La création symbolique d’une colonie, 49—57, as well as S. Sa?d, “La condamnation du muth?des par Thucydide et sa postérité dans l’historiographie grecque”, in V. Fromentin, S. Gotteland, P. Payen (edd.), Ombres de Thucydide. La réception de l’historien depuis l’Antiquité jusqu’au début du XXe siècle (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010).Although it now belongs to written composition, once again the persuasive begets the useful. If the historical reality of the Trojan War and its illustrious protagonists is never questioned by Thucydides, it is not only because the deeds of heroic times belong to the community’s history, but even more so because they constitute the origin of, and the explanation for the present. Like Minos’ f irst expedition in Cretan waters, the Trojan War signals the future Athenian control over the Aegean Sea; it thus preempts the direct cause of the Peloponnesian war, in the present moment of historical writing. As we will see, this etiological and pragmatic relationship with the present applies to the entire cohort of Hellenic myths which, in our adherence to an entirely different belief system, we associate with the modern category of f iction.

Let us remember that in the fourth century, the master rhetorician Isocrates resorts heavily to the great heroic epics that are the foundation of Greece as he knows it to legitimize claims for a new Athenian hegemony: the time of Heracles and his descendants the Heraclidae, the Trojan war naturally, but also the Persian wars, which with the passing of time now belong to thepalaiáof the forefathers’tradition. In hisPanegyric, a work that praises the historical virtues of Athens, the orator even goes so far as to posit an incursion into the ages of the gods. Indeed, the oratorical praise of the most ancient (arkhaiotáte) city of Greece proceeds from an allusion to its origins; in its claim to panhellenism, the foundation of Athenian civilization coincides with the f irst intervention of Demeter. Welcomed in Attica as a result of her search for her daughter Persephone, the goddess of the milled wheat harvest bestows upon the Athenians not only agriculture, but also the hope of a better life and the promise of happiness in the hereafter via the initiation rites of Eleusis.[44]Isocrates, Panegyricus 26—33; on the use of “myths” by Attic orators, see the many references and commentaries assembled in my study in C. Calame, “M?thos, lógos et histoire. Usages du passé héro?que dans la rhétorique grecque”, L’Homme 147 (1998): 134—142.Can we question this account? Should we challenge it? This tradition, very much alive in regard to thesearkha?a, is supplemented by the honors that other cities continue to bestow upon Athens in memory of Demeter’s benevolence. TheDelphic oracle’s sanction but conf irms the convergence between the words that describe the past and the actions that take place in the present. Ultimately, the crucial element is ritual practice and its yearly reiteration: “still now” these objects are shown in the use and eff icacious function imparted by the city. It is therefore by way of ritual practice that the seemingly f ictional account (muthódes lógos) f inds its truth in its social eff icacy and function.

Plato himself — as we well know — does not hesitate to endow the protagonists of his dialogues with a verbal preference for mythical tales. Such, for example, is the case of Socrates who, paradoxically, envisions a tale such as Atlantis as not just a fashioned “myth” (plastheìs m?thos), but as a prelude to truthful discourse (alethinòs lógos); this precisely on the day when Athenians bestow cultic honors upon the tutelary goddess.[45]Plato, Timaeus 26e; specif ically, see also Gorgias 523a (the account of the establishment of the adjudication of souls by Minos and Rhadamanthys, daughter of Zeus), or Protagoras 320c (the account of Prometheus’ establishment of human civilization); on the creation and argumentative role of “myths” in Plato, cf. G. Cerri, La poetica di Platone: una teoria della comunicazione (Lecce: Argo, 2007), 39—58, as well as C. Calame, Mythe et histoire dans l’antiquité grecque. La création symbolique d’une colonie, 42—49, 256—260, with references to the abundant bibliography generated by Plato’s“myths”.It is worth noting that in passing, we have returned to the notion of a fabricated discourse which has acquired a strong pragmatic relationship with the present situation via its enunciative circumstances.

The awareness of the pragmatic function of any plausible story, and the notion of f iction as untruthful, but leaning towards versimilitude, are both profoundly anchored in the realm of Greek poetics. Must we remind ourselves that it is Hesiod himself who made the Olympian Muses voice these famous words: “We know how to tell (légein) many lies that resemble true things (etúmoisin homo?a); and we know, if we wish it, how to sing (gerúsasthai) the truth”. These words are presented to theI-poet who, grazing his ewes on Helicon, has just identif ied himself asHesiod. These divine utterances are followed by an immediate and dual outcome: on the one hand the Muses, artisans of poetry (artiépeiai), supplement their poetic vow with the ritual gift of the laurel branch, thus validating the inspiration which is now bestowed upon the poet; by way of a prelude, on the other hand, theI-bard does indeed begin his theogonic song with a poetic praise of the Muses themselves.[46]Hesiod, Theogony 22—39; this passage has been the subject of countless commentaries, among which B. Lincoln, Theorizing Myth. Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 3—18 (see other references in note 2 and in C. Calame, Poétique des mythes dans la Grèce antique, 165 n.23).Inspired by theMuses, the theogonic tale that we would label as f iction, bases its veracity as much on its divine origin as on the context of its articulation. The pragmatic relationship between the genealogically modeled story of the gods and the circumstances of its song is established through poetic fabrication, in the sense of an inspired work of art.[47]In C. Calame, Poétique des mythes dans la Grèce antique, 38—42, I aimed to outline the terms of the paradox presented by poems that are conceived as being the products of both divine inspiration and the poet’s artistic ability.

2. (Post) modern Fiction

Yet, as we glance upon this distant poetic (not literary) culture through the eyes of historical anthropology, upon a culture which the Greco-Roman world has presented to us in writing, we are compelled in turn to critically examine the paradigm on which we depend. As relates to f iction, since we cannot identify an internal parameter that might distinguish f ictitious discourse from factual discourse, it seems henceforth conceded that the only possible criterion falls under the aegis of the pragmatics of discourse. If the verbal permeability between the factual and the f ictitious is such that none of the discursive methods of enunciation, temporalization, and spatialization can constitute a determining criterion for f ictitiousness, if thus, as John Searle had stated, “there is no textual, syntactic or semantic property that might allow the identif ication of a text as a work of f iction”, then the f ictitious account is but a simple matter of make-believe perhaps even “playful make-believe” (“feintise ludique”).[48]J. R. Searle, Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 65—66; on this subject see G. Genette, Fiction et diction (Paris: Seuil, 1991), 87 (repris dans Fiction et diction, précédé de Introduction à l’architexte [Paris: Seuil, 2004], 143) and the valuable critical comments of R. Shusterman, “Fiction, réel, référence”, Littérature 123 (2001).Yet, can verbal or visual f iction now be reduced to a mere task of mental shaping, for in an often playful use? Through its representational component, does f iction correspond to the ability to f ictionally immerse by appealing to the recipient’s aesthetic sense, and by satisfying his sensitive interest? Must we then go back to understanding f iction as mimetic immersion in its representational sense, probably enacted as much by the one who creates the f ictitious discourse as by those who perceive it?[49]That in order to take over in form of questions the proposals made in the study of J.-M. Schaeffer, Pourquoi la f iction?, 327—335, the title of his book itself takes on an interrogative form.Does this mean that f ictitiousness is a skill shared between thecreator and the public, or in other words, that the production and reception of f iction constitute a specif ic competence?

In this scenario, f iction has only an intrinsic function, that of aesthetic satisfaction, “as a playful use of the representational endeavor”. Such a statement certainly evokes the beginning of thePoetics. For Aristotle, poetic composition springs from its natural tendency toward representation; from his perspective, it is also on account of this mimetic faculty that man distinguishes himself from other animals. Manifested as early as in childhood, this capacity for imitation is complemented by the pleasure (khaírein) that, as human beings, we draw from imitations (mimémata).[50]Aristotle, Poetics 4, 1448b 4—19; cf. J.-M. Schaeffer, Pourquoi la f iction?, 329, for the citation.Admittedly, artistic f iction cannot be assimilated with a suppositional universe founded on the experience of thought. On the other hand, from neither a rhetorical nor pragmatic point of view, we cannot entirely differentiate it from other types of discourse which, like in anthropology or history, also resort to verbal processes of narration, of illustration by image, of induced imagination through metaphor, of patterning via schematization. As playful as it may be, the “as if” of the make-believe implies internal and external verisimilitude: verisimilitude in the logic of the conceivable world that has been created, no matter how imaginary it may be, but also in its acceptability within a given cultural paradigm. In fact, plausibility allows artistic f iction to be effective, even if only from the point of view of aesthetics and entertainment.

However, a simple recourse to verisimilitude is not suff icient. Indeed, if it is true that “artistic f iction is always embodied in a medium that in itself has a simulating component”, the implication is that the conceivable world that has been created by way of this verbal or pictorial medium is related to the referent world. The same goes for the semantic capacity of any form of discourse which, by way of semiotic support, evokes but also transforms referential images; in this respect, f ictional representations could not be considered as “endogenousandendotelic”.[51]Pace J.-M. Schaeffer, “Quelles vérités pour quelles f ictions?”, L’Homme 175/176 (2005): 33 and 35.The use of a verbal or a visual medium is the reason why f iction necessarily refers to something that it is not, that its representational nature is inevitable, independent of any neuronal process of perception and interpretation from which its pragmatic effects are achieved. Since it depends on verbal or visual composition, its semanticdepth sustains itself through reference, in production as in reception.

In reducing the condition of artistic f iction to its contract of reception and to a playful make-believe, one runs the risk of reverting to the position held by Fontenelle on the subject of Greek myths. “Religion and common sense have disabused us of the Greek legends; yet they endure among us in the form of poetry and painting, in which they seem to have discovered the secret for making themselves necessary. Although we are considerably more enlightened than those whose crude spirit invented the myths in good faith, we easily take up the same logic that made the myths so enjoyable for them; they indulged themselves of them because they believed them, and we indulge ourselves of them with equal pleasure without believing them; there is no better proof that imagination and reason have no business in common ...”.[52]B. Le Bovier de Fontenelle, De l’origine des fables (Paris: Desjonquères, 1724), 109 (cité dans l’édition par A. Niderist sous le titre Rêveries diverses. Opuscules littéraires et philosophiques [Paris: Desjonquères, 1994],109); in conf lict with the Jesuit father Joseph-Francois Laf itau’s undertaking in historical comparison, see M. Detienne, L’invention de la mythologie (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), 19—25.Thus does Fontenelle seem to already suggest the reduction of f iction to a kind of “playful make-believe”: imagination without reason? Yet, evolutionist primitivism aside, he is conscious that this act of relegation can only be performed by us, as modern selves confronted with legends now detached from the belief system wherein they existed. Moreover, despite being a front-runner in the denigration of myth, he acknowledges that it is their semiotic form, poetry or painting, which safeguards their tradition and consequently their effectiveness, even if it is but aesthetic.

3. Greek and Pragmatic Fictions

The basic principle of a militant cultural and social anthropology is well known. To approach a culture that is distant in both time and space without applying a counterbalanced assessment for our own time would be in a certain sense to give in to playful make-believe: an oblique perspective on the postmodern paradigm on which we rely, in and through its very differences. In regard to modern conceptions of f iction (and of literature), an oblique approach will therefore be stimulated by myths whose reality and effectiveness exist only in the poetic and visual form that their communication assumes, and within the representational universe into which they are implanted.

3.1 Rhetorical and Political Uses of Myths (Lycurgus)

In order to ensure the pragmatic impact of Greek myths, which an extensive illuminist tradition often uses as examples of narrative f iction par excellence, it is particularly necessary to pay attention to genre rules. Their regularities are one of the essential pillars of the Greek poem’s pragmatic function as envisioned in its ritualized “performance”, divided as they are between the linguistic regularities born from the rhythmic articulation of a poetic language that is formulaically highly f lexible, and the social conventions related to the circumstances of its production and reception.

In 338 BCE, in the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea that marks the victory of Philip II of Macedon over the Athenians, a citizen named Leocrates f lees the city and seeks refuge in Rhodes. Upon his return to Athens, he is brought to justice by Lycurgus, a great orator who indicts him with treason. Addressing himself to the Athenians, Lycurgus does not hold back from putting forward a series of examples of civic courage, the very antitheses of Leocrates’ cowardly behavior. He begins with an anonymous account (légetai) which, although it may appear to be more or less f ictional (muth?désteron), is no less “suited” to the youngest: once again, effectiveness takes precedence over implausible appearance. There is certainly some lack of verisimilitude in this account of a man who, during an eruption of Mount Etna, took care of his helpless father when all others f led from the burning torrents; surrounded by f laming lava, the two men alone were spared and saved by the gods, whose benevolent attentions are aimed at good men. In this speech by Lycurgus, it is the etiological process that ultimately guarantees the account’s plausibility: “still now” (éti kaì n?n), this site is the one “of the pious men”. By means of a toponym, the veracity of the account is in a certain sense inscribed onto, and corroborated by the Sicilian landscape.[53]Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 95—97.

Yet, to conjure thesepalaia, the heroic past that in our eyes corresponds to myth, one must travel from Sicily to Athens. Here again, it is an anonymous account that relates (phasi) the story of the incursion in Attica of the Thracian king Eumolpus, a son of Poseidon. Faced with danger, Erechteus consults the Delphic oracle who instructs the king of Athens to sacrif ice his daughter to secure victory over Eumolpus. The king obeys the oracle, sacrif ices his daughter, and succeeds in repelling the country’s invaders. This foundation story is known to us primarilythrough a tragedy by Euripides, from which Lycurgus cites a long excerpt. The f loor is given to Erechtheus’ wife, who has been called forth to approve her daughter’s sacrif ice; with this citation, the orator gives his argument a poetic spin. Thus through the language of tragedy does he evoke the legendary and poetic f igure of Praxithea, who he presents as an example of graciousness and civic nobility. Prepared to sacrif ice hero?kos, her family and her home for her city, turn by turn Praxithea adopts feminine and masculine perspectives: she sings the praises of female maternity, through which male citizens capable of defending their fatherland are given life. In the absence of male progeny, and in the name of the autochthonous origin claimed by the Athenians, the king’s wife consents to her daughter’s sacrif ice. By the end of the tragedy, she will be the sole survivor. The two sisters of the young maiden who died upon the altar have sacrif iced themselves in solidarity, and at the outcome of a nevertheless victorious battle, Erechtheus is killed by Poseidon’s trident, struck in revenge for the death of his son Eumolpus: the king of Athens thus returns to the bowels of the earth, whence he was born as Erichthonios from Hephaistos’ sperm, dispersed across fertile soil in his vein attempt to have sex with the virgin goddess Athena.

From a literally autochthonous birth to human sacrif ice and to divinely willed death as burial within the bowels of the earth, the implausibilities of this foundation story are not even addressed by the orator. The “myth” represented on the Attic stage acquires its historical reality and its pragmatic impact through its dual relationship with the present. On the one hand, its protagonists are the ancestors of the Athenians whose forefathers have been shaped by its tradition; on the other hand its use as an example of the priority of love for one’s fatherland over that of one’s own children is the poet’s doing. The orator’s conclusion is incontrovertible:“If women are capable of such an act, then men must give absolute priority to their homeland and never abandon it, nor dishonor it before all Greeks as Leocrates did.”[54]Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 98—101, citing Euripides, Erechtheus fr. 360 Kannicht (= 14 Jouan-Van Looy); the dual role assumed by Praxithea as mother and citizen is well def ined by V. SEBILLOTTE. CUCHET, “La place de la maternité dans la rhétorique patriotique de l’Athènes classique (Ve—IVesiècles avant notre ère): autour de Praxithéa”, in L. Fournier-Finocchiaro (ed.), Les mères de la patrie: Représentations et constructions d’une f igure nationale, Cahiers de la MRSH 45 (2006): 237—250; see also G. Sissa & M. Detienne, La vie quotidienne des dieux grecs (Paris: Hachette, 1989), 238—245.

3.2 The Fiction of Myths and its Cultic Utility (Euripides)

Yet, at the end of the f ifth century, Euripides’ tragedy itself establishes a particularly strong relationship between them?thosthat is represented on the stage of Dionysian theater and the cultic practices of its Athenian spectators. Indeed, the tragic scenario leads to a threnodic song that concludes the tragedy by lamenting the destiny of Erechtheus’ family and of the city fallen prey to the destructive folly of Poseidon’s wrath. Then follows the intervention of Athena herself; in all the glory of adea ex machina, and with the authoritative voice of a patron goddess of the city. With the etiological prospect that often concludes Euripides’ tragedies, the goddess bestows cultic honors upon all the Athenian protagonists of the dramatic events that have just unfolded.[55]The etiological conclusions of Euripides’ tragedies, far from being the poet’s inventions, generally correspond to practiced cults; on this controversial question, see in particular Ch. Sourvinou-Inwood, Tragedy and Athenian Religion (Lanham — Boulder — New York — Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002), 414—422.First for the three young girls of the royal Athenian couple, who will regularly benef it from musical devotions in the form of choral dances performed by young girls around an inaccessible sanctuary-tomb, but also from sacrif icial offerings on the eve of battles fought by the city; then for Erechtheus, who will be jointly honored with Poseidon by the sacrif ice of oxen in a sanctuary located atop the Acropolis; and f inally for Praxithea, who becomes the f irst priestess of Athena to be celebrated with sacrif ices offered by both the men and women of Athens to her altar on the Acropolis.[56]Euripides, Erechtheus fr. 370, 55—100 Kannicht (= fr. 22, 55—100 Jouan-Van Looy); the f igure of Poseidon-Erechtheus is well characterized in all his different functions by S. Darthou, “Retour à la terre: la f in de la Geste d’érecthée”, Kernos 18 (2005).

By way of Athena’s intervention via her staged epiphany, the dramatic narrative of the spectacular and tragic death of the legendary king Erechtheus and his daughters results in a ritual: not only in the foundation of cultic acts honoring the two patron deities of the city, Athena and Poseidon, but especially in the staging of the very ritual practices that are annually undertaken by the spectators who are gathered together in the sanctuary-theater of Dionysus built at the southern foot of the Acropolis. The pragmatic nature of the relationship between the foundation myth represented on the Attic stage, and thehicet nuncof dramatic representation with all its cultic and social implications, is all the more pronounced that the action has a double relationship with the historical conjuncture of the tragic representation as ritual musical performance. On the one hand, the recollection of the “myth” of theinvasion of Attica by the Thracian king’s troops evokes the incursions of the Spartan army that marked the f irst phase of the Peloponnesian war; it ends at the time of the tragedy’s performance around 422. On the other hand, this ritualized dramatization very likely coincides with the actual construction of the Erechtheion, meant to replace the old temple of Athena, destroyed by the Persians before the battle of Salamis; let us remember that this architecturally composite sanctuary is intended to assemble all the relics of Athens and Attica’s primordial and foundational history, from the mark of Poseidon’s trident that sprang water from the Aegean sea into the rocks of the Acropolis, to the olive tree of Athena, reborn immediately after the burning of the Acropolis by the army of Xerxes.[57]On this subject, cf. C. Calame, Mythe et histoire dans l’antiquité grecque. La création symbolique d’une colonie (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012) (on the Erechtheion, see references given in notes 7 and 42).Inscribed onto the space of the city and within its ritual calendar, the sanctuary becomes an architectural reference to the various narratives that unravel the economic and civic fertility of the land of Attica on the occasion of the great musical and ritual competitions devoted to Dionysios Eleuthereus. In its foundational character, the legendary tale assumes its religious and social effectiveness through the aesthetic power of the revisited dramatic form that Euripides gives it. The “myth” obtains its referential and pragmatic authenticity through communal musical performance, without which it would not exist.

Nevertheless, the example of an Athenian woman embracing the values of male citizenship without renouncing maternity and her love of children (qualities which the tragedian Euripides considers intrinsic to feminine nature), is apparently not suff icient to convince the audience of the rhetor Lycurgus. One must go even further into the past. Like all melic poets, the requisite reference must be made to the panhellenic tradition that Homeric poetry represents; the reference has to be made to the great deeds performed by male warriors on the great stage of narrative f iction that is the battlef ield of Troy. In this particular case, the complementary and cogent example of unconditional love for one’s country is supplied by Hector when he exhorts the Trojans to defend it: to die in battle is to die with glory, safeguarding not only the fatherland but also one’s wife, children, and home. In choosing the example of Hector’s sermon to his troops rather than the hero’s death, Lycurgus can liken his rhetorical standpoint to that of the great Trojan hero. By using this enunciativestrategy, the Athenian orator confers effectiveness to the substance of his own discourse, but also to the performance of the harangue itself. This is undoubtedly the reason why he reminds his audience of the ancestral law which dictates that every four years, the epic verses of Homer and other poets must be recited during the rhapsodic competition that marks the celebration of the Great Panatheneia in honor of the patron goddess Athena. The most glorious heroic deeds of the Greeks are nothing if they are not given life by ritual “demonstration” (epídeixis).[58]Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 102—104, citing Homer, Iliad 15, 494—499. For the model provided by “Homer” for values of warfare in Classical Athens, see for example Aristophanes, Frogs 1036 and, for classical rhetoric, Isocrates, Panegyricus 159. One of the most controversial, the question of the historicity of the Trojan war has recently been reexamined in an raher conf ident study by J. Latacz, Troy and Homer Towards a Solution of an Old Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).It is on the occasion of the great religious and civic celebration of the patron goddess Athena that Homer’s f ictions assume their effectiveness. And it is through the beauty of Homer’s verses and their ritual performance that the good deeds of the heroes of the Trojan War thrive as civic examples,hic et nunc.

3.3 Ritual Pragmatism in Poetry (Theocritus)

What happens, then, when the center that disseminates the great traditions of Greek poetry relocates to Alexandria, where they are made to benef it a monarchic system inf luenced partly by Macedonian monarchy and partly by pharaonic political hierarchy? How do f iction as poetic composition and the heroic narrative fare when the various forms of pragmatic poetry are reduced to text and transferred into the new library to be studied in that very state? What becomes of poetic and f ictional creation in the hands of erudite scholars who identify themselves aspoietaì háma kaì kritikoí, in a literary f ield in the modern sense of the term?

A perfect example of what becomes of ritual and pragmatic poetry within a culture inclining toward literature is a composition attributed to Theocritus, the founder of bucolic poetry. Classif ied as “idyll” in a generic designation that refers only to its “short (poetic) form”, theEpithalamion of Helenis written in dactylic hexameters as would an epic poem, but it is presented in the form of a hymenaeus: a wedding chant that is sung and danced to by a choral group of young girls on the occasion of three cardinal moments in the rite of passage that is the Greek marriage ceremony — at the banquet in the home of the bride’s father, during the ritual procession that escorts the f iancée to the home of her future husband, and f inally within the home of the married couple on their wedding night. The hymenaeus, ofwhich Sappho f illed an entire book of songs published as epithalamia, traditionally sings the praises of the groom and then the bride, while at the same time fulf illing in a performative manner the nuptial rite of passage on behalf of the young bride. Thus, in a manner that conforms to tradition more than any other, poetic praise takes pride of place: f irst as ironic questions directed at the young husband Menelaus on the subject of heavy sleeping, then as praise with a derivative of the customary form of the macarismos: “Happy husband!”, he who has wedded the daughter of a god and will have Zeus himself as father in law.[59]Theocritus, Idyll 18, with the commentary by R. Hunter. Theocritus and the Archaeology of Greek Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 149—161.

From an enunciative point of view, and borrowing the operational categories elaborated by émile Benveniste for the “système formel de l’énonciation”, two processes are worth noting. On the one hand, while maintaining the second personyou, which belongs to the realm of “discours”, the reference to Menelaus ushers us into thearkha?aof which the legendary history of Greece (for us the myths) are composed; from a spatial and temporal point of view, the bygone age and the setting of events in Sparta are what characterizes the “histoire/récit”.[60]On the subject of the distinction between “histoire/récit” and “discours” and the productive uses one can make of it in the study of the pragmatics of ancient Greek poetry, I have discussed on several occasions and especially in Calame 2005: 14—40.On the other hand, the allusion to Zeus immediately focuses the praise onto the bride, in accordance with the tradition of the hymanaeus as a poetic genre. Helen is then spoken of at length, radiant as she was among the young girls that are in the very midst of singing the hymenaeus: “All of us here, participants in the race alongside the waves of the Eurotas, covered in oil in the manner of men, four times sixty young girls, a young band of women; not one of us entirely faultless if compared to Helen” (lines 22—25). At the very moment when the respective planes of the “récit” and the “discours”intersect once again, mythic narration is superimposed onto ritual description.

Henceforth, the nuptial praise is directly addressed to Helen, who is invoked in the vocative form as “beautiful and charming young woman” (line 38) and is now envisioned in her role as household mistress. Come from the near past, her tribute now turns to the immediate future, in an etiological prospect dear to Alexandrian poets.[61]The numerous etiological uses of Greek myths are presented by Ch. Delattre, Manuel de mythologie grecque (Paris: Bréal, 2005), 185—222.Indeed, the beautiful Helen’s (mythic) journey from adolescent to young bride provides the opportunity to describe the ritual which the choir of young girlssinging the poem are about to establish in order to perpetuate the memory of the beautiful and divine young woman as theparthénosshe was: an offering of libations and a crown, set under the shade of plane tree, henceforth referred to as “the tree of Helen” (line 57).

The poem concludes like any hymenaeus, with well wishes directed at both thenumphéthat is the young bride, and at her husband. It will be the prerogative of Leto Kourotrophos to grant them beautiful offspring, that of Athena reciprocal love, and that of Zeus everlasting prosperity. After thewewho perform the poem promise to return in order to sing the traditional morning chant, the poem ends on the same refrain that accompanies the ritual form of the marriage chant: “Hymen ? Hymenaeus”. The hero is summoned and invited to take part in the present wedding, through the use of verbal deixis that characterizes the melic poem which, through it ritual quality, has now become a sung performance.[62]On the pragmatics of the verbal uses of deixis that characterize different forms of ritual Greek poetry, see my study in Calame: 2005b.

In its mythically f ictional context, does the narration and heroic staging of the exemplary marriage between Helen and Menelaus result in the celebration of a nuptial ritual in thehic et nuncof the poem’s chanted performance? To say so would be to ignore the introductory verses of Theocritus’ poem. In using the “once upon a time” corresponding to the time in Sparta with blond Menelaus, the young girls who are singing set the choir they represent at a temporal and narrative distance —twelve young Lacedaemonians of excellent character, singing in unison and striking the ground with an interlacing of subtle rhythms to sound out the hymenaic song. In this initial narrative staging (as in Plato’s dialogues), the enunciativeweassumes the position of the (feminine)-theyreferring to the level of the “récit”. Henceforth, the enunciative conditions of the song are expounded in the shape of the “récit” in order to be included in the narrated scene, in the mythical past where the lives of Helen the daughter of Zeus, and her contented husband Menelaus, hero of the Trojan War, unfold. Is this to say that the poem guides us into a world that is pure f iction, or playful make-believe in the modern sense of the term?

A comparison with other poems of praise by Theocritus, and the presence of the referential shifterarain the initial verse of the poem points towards an enunciative situation that involves the court poetry that develops in the context of the creation of the Alexandrian library and its sanctuary devoted to the Muses. Thereis every reason to believe that the tribute to the exemplary couple that are Helen and Menelaus on the occasion of their nuptials in Sparta in the time of heroes, is meant to evoke the royal couple reigning over the city of Alexandria that was founded at the beginning of the third century BCE: Ptolemy I Soter and his third wife Berenice, who will be deif ied in order to be associated with Aphrodite’s cult.[63]On this subject, see the different hypotheses presented by R. Hunter. Theocritus and the Archaeology of Greek Poetry, 163—166, and C. Calame, “Les f igures d’Hélène et de Ménélas dans le poème XVIII de Théocrite: entre f iction poétique, pratique rituelle et éloge du pouvoir royal”, in Ch. Cusset, N. Le Meur-Weisman, F. Levin (edd.), Mythe et pouvoir à l’époque hellénistique (Leuven — Paris — Walpole MA: Peeters, 2013). On the pragmatics of the f ictional worlds elaborated and dramatized in the pastoral Idylls of Theocritus, see M. Payne, Theocritus and the Invention of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 49—91.

4. Fiction Outside of Postmodern Textualism

We may now return to Sextus Empiricus, who does not settle for simply shattering the modern distinction between history and myth by introducing the “as if” of narrative creation into the realm of “very-similitude”; the sceptic philosopher eventually associatesm?thoswithplásma, making them both into complements of history. Indeed, from a spatial and temporal point of view, history includes not only the acts of illustrious men, but also the great deeds of heroes and interventions of the gods; thus does Asclepios resurrect certain heroes fallen beneath the walls of Thebes, cure the daughters of Proitos from Hera’s inf licted folly, or heal Hippolytus during his escape from Troezen. And Sextus Empiricus mentions his sources: poets like Stesichorus, or local historians such as Polyanthos of Cyrene or Staphylos of Naucratis. Ultimately, the only stories that would be excluded from the Homeric saga are those of heroes metamorphosing into animals, such as Hecuba was into a bitch, or Ulysses into a horse.[64]Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 260—262 and 264—265, citing, one after the other, Stesichorus fr. 194 (IV) Page-Davies, Polyanthos FGrHist. 37 F 1 and Staphylos FGrHist. 267 F 3.

Henceforth, whether in poetry or prose, we are no longer dealing with stories destined for ritualized performance; the adopted narrative form is no longer comprised of the enunciative strategies that turn a poem that narrates a reformulated heroic account into a sung performance, and thus also into a cultic act. On the other hand, the pragmatic relationship is still powerfully able to formulate that which we perceive as f iction of a mythical nature according to a measure of verisimilitude andplausibility that is founded on a cultural paradigm sustained by a very rich heroic tradition and stimulated by vibrant polytheism. The extraordinary plasticity of Greek myths bears witness to the continuous adaptations of these narrative f ictions to a cultural context that is diverse and constantly shifting.[65]On the constant remaking of Greek myths, see different studies collected in C. Calame (éd.), Métamorphoses du mythe dans la Grèce antique (Genève: Labor & Fides,1988), as well as the useful comments by R. Buxton, Imaginary Greece. The contexts of mythology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 9—66.Not a thing within it could ever be purely imaginary.

In conclusion, and in another brief foray into the modern world from a critically oblique perspective, one might wonder whether, permeated by the paradigm of technological eff iciency, video game users do not believe in the virtual reality that they are called to manipulate? Do they not participate in it aesthetically, emotionally, and intellectually? With the critical and decentered reconsideration which the anthropological approach to another culture allows us to make, an explanation that resorts from a purely pragmatic perspective to “playful make-believe” as an answer, will simply not be satisfactory. At a stage when postmodernism is fading, but that is still strongly animated by the competitive and individualistic ideology of neoliberalism, it is time to abandon the relativist textualism that stems from it in literary criticism. The aesthetic effect and emotional impact of f iction must be investigated as much in the world that narrative f iction creates as in the verbal and visual media that allow it to be built. On the one hand, no matter how imaginary it may be, the plausible world is inf luenced by a cultural paradigm within which it will be accepted by a community of users; on the other hand, the po(i)etic form it assumes insures its syntactic and semantic coherence but also its pragmatic impact. In order to be useful, f iction can only be referential! By the frequent interaction between the underlying poetics, artistic creation, and the approach of literary criticism, contemporary f iction’s claim to self-referentiality is ultimately but the effect of postmodernist textualism.

If Greek poetry, in all its various forms, is neither f iction, nor literature, it teaches us yet to ref lect on the manifestations of the verbal poie?n in terms of pragmatics, in terms of referential and cultural pragmatics. We would then speak, in a rather sophistic oxymoron, of “referential f iction”.

(Translated by Amanda Iacobelli)

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The Poetic Pragmatics of Greek Myths: Referential Fiction and Ritual Performance[34]

Claude Calame
(école des Hautes études en Sciences Sociales, Paris)

In ancient Greece as in other traditional cultures, narratives about the heroic past we are used to call “myths” would not exist without ritual forms of delivery. From Homeric poetry to tragedy, the Greeks knew and sang generally in a choral way different forms of poetry. The performative aspect of their enunciation and the metrical rhythm of their delivery made of them not only collective acts of language, but also cult acts. On the base of a few examples, the aim of this article is to explore the pragmatics, through emotional and esthetic effects, of such narrative and ritual forms of heroic past, and to defend, between factual and f ictive, the notion of “referential f iction.”

Pragmatics; Fiction; Myth; Poetic Performance

克勞德·伽拉姆目前為法國“社會科學高等研究院”（EHESS）所屬“古代世界人類學和歷史學研究中心”（AnHiMA）的榮休教授。他曾擔任瑞士洛桑大學古希臘語言與文學教授。此外，他還在意大利烏爾比諾和錫耶納大學以及美國耶魯大學等多所高校任客座教授。在他眾多的法語著作中，已譯成英語出版的有《古希臘詩歌語言的技藝》（康奈爾大學出版社，1995年）、《古希臘“愛欲”的詩學》（普林斯頓大學出版社，1999年）、《古希臘的少女歌隊》（羅曼和利特爾菲爾德出版公司，2001年第二版）、《權威的面具—古希臘詩學中的虛構性與語用學》（康奈爾大學出版社，2005年）、《古希臘的詩性記憶與表演性記憶》（哈佛大學“希臘研究中心”—哈佛大學出版社，2009年）以及《希臘神話學—詩學、語用學與虛構性》（劍橋大學出版社，2009年）。

[1] 本文譯自法文原文，與后文所刊的英譯文或有個別出入，請讀者注意?！g注